

East/North Africa Report

No. 2522



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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8 April 1982

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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REBELS KEEP FIGHTING AS EXODUS OF REFUGEES CONTINUES

London 8 DAYS in English 6 Mar 82 pp 20-21

[Text] The Russians must be wondering if there is anyone left in Afghanistan for their 85,000-man army to protect: according to a report from the UN high commissioner for refugees, one in four Afghans has fled the Russian occupation for Iran or Pakistan.

More Afghans will soon be hounded across the border, or herded into Kabul's already overcrowded dungeons, as President Babrak Karmal recently called for a purge within his own ruling marxist party. Karmal, who belongs to the Parcham faction, seized power in December 1979 after his marxist predecessor, President Hafizullah Amin, who was from the Khalq faction, was killed in a palace shoot-out. Assassinations and street fighting between the two factions have marred Karmal's regime ever since.

The job of policing this unruly mountain republic falls increasingly on the Russians. Western observers who recently returned from Kabul say that the Afghanistan army of 10,000 has dwindled over the last four years to just 30,000. Many of the soldiers have reportedly defected to the rebels, taking with them their knowledge of Russian war tactics. When Afghan troops are pushed into combat, according to embassy sources in Kabul, it is usually with the Russians prodding them from behind, firing on deserters.

Early on, the Soviets brusquely dispensed with any pretence that Karmal's regime was running its own show. One western newsman back from Kabul filed a story that the Afghan defence minister, the deputy defence minister and the commander of the Kabul garrison have all been on an extended 'training course' in Moscow, so far lasting five months. The Kabul command is being handled by 25 Russian generals, led by first deputy defence minister, Marshall Sergei Sokholov. One of the highest-ranking Soviet officers in Afghanistan, Lieutenant-General P. I. Shkidchenko, was killed recently when his helicopter was shot down by rebel rockets in the craggy Paktia province south of Kabul.

Meanwhile, the Moscow press has conceded for the first time that Soviet troops in Afghanistan have been engaged in fierce fighting. Red Star, the USSR defence ministry newspaper, said: 'We will not hide the fact that it is difficult for (the Soviet troops) and at times very, very difficult.' The newspaper reported that in clashes during January over 2,223 'bandits' were killed

and another 1,117 captured. However, spokesmen for the six main Mujaheddin factions in Peshawar, Pakistan, claimed the Russian figures were exaggerated. The Mujaheddin also say that guerrillas temporarily secured control of Jalabad, Ghazni, Kandahar and Herat, some of Afghanistan's major cities.

Despite the support of most of the Afghan population, the Mujaheddin's ability to mount a sustained and well-executed drive against the Russians is hampered by intense rivalries between the different factions. Often, the sectors controlled by each group are drawn up on old tribal lines, with the traditional feudal chieftain in control. Hezbi-Islami, for example, the largest faction (numbering 40,000 guerrillas), operates inside pockets of Pathan tribal land in the south and southeast, and also in pockets of the Panjshir Valley northeast of Kabul.

Together, the Mujaheddin's six main factions--Hezbi-Islami, Jamaat-i-Islami, Yunus Khalis, Sama, Nama, Fedayeen--plus at least nine smaller guerrilla bands, can must a fighting force of 100,000. They roam freely in the desolate border regions near Pakistan, Iran, China, and even along the mountainous 700-mile-long border with Russia. The Sama and the Nama are secular groups who reportedly receive arms and backing from China, which is glad to see its Soviet foe pinned down in Afghanistan. In addition there are tens of thousands of Afghans who readily shelter the guerrillas.

Meanwhile, a group of UN experts investigating charges that the Russians used chemical weapons against the Afghan guerrillas has ended a two-week visit to Pakistan. After interviewing Afghan refugees suspected of having been affected by chemical agents, the four UN officials left Pakistan refusing to comment on their findings. The results of the inquiry will be submitted to the next UN General Assembly.

CSO: 4600/352

SPECULATION AIRED ABOUT SUCCESSOR TO KHOMEYNI

London 8 DAYS in English 6 Mar 82 pp 20-21

[Article by Tim McGirk]

[Text] Ayatollah Khomeini broke a two-week vow of silence to dispel rumours that he had suffered a heart attack and was near death. In a radio broadcast, the frail 81-year-old revolutionary leader said: 'A couple of days ago while listening to the radio I heard that a foreign radio has reported that Khomeini is dying ... the man supposed to be dying was listening to them (Iranian ex-iles who spread the story of his illness) and laughing at them.'

The heart attack story was sparked off by a report that President Ali Khomeini had set up a 'Council of Regency', composed of three high-ranking clergymen, to appoint a successor to Ayatollah Khomeini. The rumour gathered pace when Khomeini suddenly cancelled all appointments for two weeks and summoned his immediate family to his well-guarded home in the north Tehran suburbs. Among those ordered back to Khomeini's bedside was his grandson, Ali, who was banished to a Qom theological seminary after his outspoken criticism of the ruling fundamentalist regime.

By 19 February, at the peak of the rumour, Iranian opposition sources in Europe were circulating a story that Ayatollah Khomeini had died in Switzerland after undergoing unsuccessful surgery there performed by Dr Sadeghi, an Iranian heart specialist.

Khomeini was apparently prompted to record his alive-and-well message during a visit by the Iranian president, the Supreme Court chief, the prime minister, and the Majlis speaker. The quality of the recording was extremely poor and Khomeini, usually a powerful orator, was uncharacteristically mumbling. The ayatollah also asked the four fundamentalist leaders to speed up 'a considerable number' of amnesties for Iranian prisoners. Whether this referred to any of the estimated 20,000 political prisoners was not revealed.

Nevertheless, the creation of the 'Council of Regency' led to speculation of a rift between the fundamentalist government. Previously, another clergyman, Ayatollah Montazeri, had been widely touted as Khomeini's successor. Montazeri earned himself the nickname 'Khomeini's Bilal' for appearing at the Friday Prayer at Qom carrying a submachine gun. (Bilal was one of the Prophet

Mohammed's most devout followers, a black Ethiopian who became Islam's first muezzin.) However, Montazeri's militancy, according to opposition sources in Paris, has enraged many.

Montazeri's enemies reportedly include the powerful Majlis speaker, Hojatolislam Rafsanjani, and President Ali Khomeini--who all proposed the 'Council of Regency'. As usual, Khomeini hedged his bets. Although close to Montazeri, a former theological student of his, Khomeini is aware that he lacks support among moderate clergymen.

Some political analysts claim that less than a fifth of Iran's 20,000 mullahs joined the pro-fundamentalist government party--the Islamic Republic Party--and Khomeini must realise that a battle for his succession would only weaken the hardliners' already feeble hold on the country.

Meanwhile, opponents of the Khomeini regime exploded a large bomb last week outside the Vali-Ye-Asr barracks of the Revolutionary Guards, killing 15 people and wounding another 60--most of them children walking to school, according to Tehran radio. The bomb, hidden inside a parked rubbish lorry, went off during the morning rush hour. There were no reports on what damage if any the nearby barracks had suffered.

The national Iranian news agency, Irna, indicated that pro-monarchists might have planted the bomb. The explosion, they said, was timed to go off on the anniversary of the 1919 coup, which brought the Pahlavi dynasty to power.

CSO: 4600/351

TRADE AGREEMENT WITH INDIA

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Mar 82 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, March 16 (IRNA) — The visiting Indian mission headed by Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of international and economic affairs of that country, Mr. Bandri, met and conferred with Commerce Minister Asgar Owladi on Monday.

They discussed historical and cultural relations of the two nations and the further mutual expansion of trade relations.

The Iranian minister of commerce outlined the Iranian trade policy and Iran's trade priority being given to Muslim countries and then non-aligned countries.

Mr. Bandri said that he hoped that the visit of the Indian commerce minister to Iran and signing an agreement would open a new era in the countries relations.

Mr. Bandri this morning also met and conferred with Foreign Minister Velayati and they discussed mutual interests of the two countries. Mr. Bandri on behalf of Indian foreign minister invited Dr. Velayati to India.

Mr. Bandri and his delegation arrived in Tehran on Thursday to hold negotiations with various Iranian officials.

Also the Indian delegation headed by Ramesh Bandri the Economic Deputy of the Indian Foreign Affairs Minister who is currently visiting IRNA, on Sunday afternoon met and conferred with the Foreign Trade Undersecretary of the Ministry of Commerce, Majid Hedayatzadeh. In this meeting Hedayatzadeh praised the righteous struggle of the people of India against col-

onialism. He further added that the Iranian nation after the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and after thwarting plots of enemies, with its new stability had started military, political and economic planning.

He further added that the Islamic Republic of Iran in reaching industrial independence would make use of the valuable experience of India and also hoped that through information exchanges between the two countries and studying available potentials and expansion of mutual relations to the desired level would be reached.

In reply Bandri said that the expansion of relations between Iran and India was important not only because of their being neighbors but also because both countries were members of the Non-Aligned Movement. These reasons, he added, increased the need for friendship between Iran and India. In the continuation of his speech Bandri said that India did not pay any attention to the economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the imperialist countries and added that he was happy that Iran in this war had overcome its economic problems.

On the basis of these negotiations, a special committee was formed to study problems and ways of expanding trade relations between the two countries and paving the way for the signing of new agreements in the near future when the Indian Minister of Commerce travels to Iran.

CLANDESTINE RADIO CONDEMNS REGIME STANCE ON BAZAARIS

NC271636 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 27 Mar 82

[Summary from poor reception] Khomeyni is determined "to neutralize the power and importance of the bazaar in the political life and economic scene at any price" and to halt this important resistance force from its movement.

From the very start, the Islamic Republic "adopted wicked measures" to this effect among which was the imprisonment and execution of those bazaaris who had realized that they had been deceived. However, all efforts were futile, because among all the people who supported Khomeyni at the start, "the bazaaris were the ones with the greatest of regrets" and people who had turned into the regime's enemies.

"After the execution, imprisonment and torturing of the heads of the bazaar, even those who were indifferent" until then started to struggle, and it was not long before the bazaar turned into a trench of struggle against Khomeyni.

There is no doubt that when the regime nationalized foreign trade, it intended to use this as a weapon to fight the bazaaris. The regime's next intention is to "unjustly confiscate that which has remained of the bazaar shopkeeper's capital by imposing heavy taxes."

"Khomeyni" does not know that the declaration of war on the bazaar" never brought good results for anyone. He does not know what the aftermath of this war will be. "But those who are acquainted with the history of the bazaar's struggles know how dearly (?rulers) pay for eradicating and killing the bazaaris."

CSO: 4640/221

FRENCH PRESS QUOTED ON SHAH REMARKS

NC271708 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT
27 Mar 82

[Text] The latest issue of the Paris weekly LE FIGARO devotes its cover and several pages to pictures of the royal family [of Iran] in Egypt [words indistinct] as well as pictures of Reza Pahlavi during military exercises. This article appears under the title "[word indistinct] Reza Pahlavi, the Son of Mohammad Reza Shah, Is Preparing To Return to Iran," and the weekly has published reports by its correspondents who met with the young shah of Iran in Morocco. On the occasion of the new Iranian year, Reza Pahlavi has spoken about his views, objectives and plans on an imminent return to Iran. We invite our listeners to listen to a text of this report which will be broadcast by the Free Voice of Iran tomorrow.

FRANCE SOIR newspaper of Paris has (?published a picture) of Reza Pahlavi next to the traditional haft sin table [dealing with Iranian new year ceremony] and writes: The son of the late shah continues to consider himself the heir to the throne and crown which his father (?lost) 3 years ago. He, who declared himself the shah of Iran in October 1980 according to the Iranian constitution, (?in an article) which he has sent to this newspaper's offices says, in addition to his new year message and wishes, that this is the third spring that the Iranians have observed the new year ceremonies under the domination of a regime that has left nothing but (?blood and tears) for the Iranian nation. Reza Pahlavi has added that the ruling regime has drawn the country to destruction during this 3-year period. During this period this godless regime implemented the satanic plans of foreigners who thought of nothing but the economic, cultural and social destruction of Iran.

In continuation, FRANCE SOIR writes: Referring to the Iran-Iraq war, Reza Pahlavi states that Iran and the Iranians are compelled to tolerate the difficulties stemming from the destructive war, while at the same time they are facing difficulties stemming from the chaotic economic conditions. FRANCE SOIR writes in conclusion: The young shah states that the ship of Iran has passed numerous tempests and that there is no doubt that it will also pass this tempest and calls on the Iranians to join struggling groups and not spare any efforts toward the liberation of Iran. The young shah of Iran adds that the day of victory is near and we should liberate Iran by the Iranians themselves without waiting for foreign powers [to help].

WAR SITUATION REPORTING DISCUSSED

NC271740 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT
27 Mar 82

[Excerpts] The propaganda staff of Khomeyni's Islamic Republic, which has invited foreign correspondents to visit the war fronts, has set, as the condition for accepting these correspondents, their support for the Islamic Republic and has said that only correspondents who have thus far worked to the benefit of the Islamic Republic and who are faithful to the Islamic revolution can come to Iran and inspect the war fronts.

A Free Voice of Iran correspondent has reported that Khomeyni's regime does not dare to invite foreign correspondents to Iran (?without these conditions), because the situation in Iran, and especially in Tehran, is so chaotic and the number of dissatisfied people so great that if the correspondents could freely prepare documentary reports, they would portray Iran as a true hell in which the people [words indistinct]. The Free Voice of Iran correspondent says in his report that Khomeyni's Islamic Republic only wants the foreign correspondents to fabricate [words indistinct] as its lie-disseminating propaganda machinery does.

Since we do not receive correct information from the war fronts and have heard numerous lies on the war developments, we will refrain from publishing any such reports in our newscast until we receive true reports. But we know that the mullahs' radio tells big lies, hoping that the listeners will believe them. But we regret to say that any listener who believes the lies broadcast by the radio of Khomeyni's regime is very ignorant and (?lacking the least sense of intelligence).

CSO: 4640/221

SOVIET ENVOY MEETING WITH VELAYATI NOTED

GF281857 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT
28 Mar 82

[Text] The Soviet ambassador in Tehran met today with 'Ali Akbar Velayati, the foreign minister of Khomeyni's neither East nor West regime. During the meeting the ambassador discussed Soviet policies with regard to Iran's interests. It is said that at this meeting the Soviet ambassador stressed the continuation of Soviet military and economic aid to Khomeyni's regime--which has fallen into the arms of Soviet imperialism.

Our correspondent reports from Tehran that it has been some time since talks have been held between the Soviet Government and the authorities of the Islamic Republic's tyrannical government on the sale of Iranian gas to the Soviet Union and the exploitation of oil resources in northern Iran and the Caspian Sea. Those aware of the problems with oil and Iran's history know that it has been a longstanding Soviet imperialist goal to obtain control of the northern oil resources and that the Soviet Union has played a role in establishing communist parties in Iran, including the Tudeh Party, to achieve this goal.

So far, through the courage of the nationalist Iranians, the implementation of this Soviet imperialist plan has been thwarted and the use of the northern oil has not been agreed on to prevent the agents of international communism to obtain control of these natural resources in this part of our country. However, the illegal regime of the Islamic Republic today has presented this [word indistinct] on a platter--as it has done with all of the wealth, natural and human resources and Iran's cultural heritage--and is handing it over to the world-devouring communists to extend the life of its tottering government.

CSO: 4640/221

IRAN

VELAYATI TALKS IN PAKISTAN NOTED

NC311346 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 30 Mar 82

[Text] The clerical government's foreign minister, 'Ali Akbar Velayati, is holding talks with Pakistani officials on the Islamic conference's efforts to end the war between the regimes of Iran and Iraq. A Voice of Iran correspondent reports from Pakistan that the mullahs' foreign minister, 'Ali Akbar Velayati, arrived in Islamabad at the head of a delegation and that the formation of the Islamic Republic's delegation shows that the talks will pivot around further purchases from Pakistan. The delegation's officials are from the Ministries of Commerce, Economy and Oil and, according to Pakistani news sources, this is explained by the fact that recently the Tehran government has expressed interest in importing agricultural products, especially rice and other foodstuffs from Pakistan. It has announced that it is ready to import the required products from Pakistan in return for oil. Informed sources in Islamabad have also told our correspondent that talks between officials of the Tehran and Islamabad governments might be held within the framework of the Islamic conference's efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war. These sources added that the Islamic Republic's delegation will also ask Pakistani officials to impose restrictions on Iranian opponents of Khomeyni's regime living in Pakistan. The Islamic Republic's Foreign Ministry undersecretary for consular affairs is to hold talks with Pakistani officials to this effect. Our correspondent adds in conclusion that at present hundreds of Iranian refugees are living in Pakistan because of their opposition to Khomeyni's regime.

CSO: 4640/221

ACTIVITIES OF IRANIANS IN DIASPORA REPORTED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 pp 10-12

[Article by Teezbin]

[Text] "The factions are generally described as at least as interested in destroying each other as in fighting the Khomeini regime"--that was the indictment of the exiled opposition groups which New York Times writer Leslie H. Gelb offered in an article last weekend on purported CIA aid for them.

According to "Western intelligence and other sources" (these latter, perhaps, among the exiles themselves) the CIA has had no success in persuading the contending factions to work together. Knitting together a coalition of exile groups and their supporters still in Iran, so that if the opportunity arises they can become a significant factor in shaping Iran's future, was said to be the aim of the programme.

The term "coalition" immediately led to knowing nods among the exiles and a lot of "I told you so's", for there had been many hints that the Americans were behind the attempts of former premier Ali Amini to get the exile groups together. Amini had always been regarded as close to Washington through much of his political life and for Iranians it wasn't surprising that he should get their backing. At least that was their claim.

But what about Admiral Adham Madani and his 6,000-8,000-strong paramilitary group in Eastern Turkey, and Bahram Aryana with the 2,000 men, Gelb said sources told him were in the same area? Are we really to believe that that number of Iranians is willing to exist for such a long time in the hardships of that inhospitable part of the world, even for Yankee dollars, when the glittering lights of Paris, London, Bonn and the United States are so near at hand? If so then there's hope for a return home for us all soon--it would probably take half that number to rid Tehran of its present rulers, according to military experts.

Madani anyway must have been commanding his men from afar for he's been seen in Europe regularly over the past few months. General Aryana's whereabouts are unknown, though he has been reported in eastern Turkey, and by his supporters, even inside Iran. Having found the delights of Paris too fascinating to allow him to tolerate even Tehran for the past decade or more it is

remarkable that at his advanced age he now finds the wastes of Anatolia so more attractive than either. But Iranians always regarded him as a little on the eccentric side.

According to Gelb Aryana and his movement Azadegan describe themselves as "moderate socialists and nationalists." Like all those scores of other groups who promise us democracy of the most perfect kind once we get back again. Small hope of that when they can't even sit around a table together against an enemy like Khomeini!

Even if the mullahs do get pushed out shortly they will almost certainly slip back in again while their replacements are arguing among themselves about who's boss, many Iranians feel.

Azadegan's headquarters in Paris are in a thoroughly smart area where a throng of young men armed with guns busies itself planning counter-revolution and checking on visitors. Outside they are guarded against the forays of any opponents by a solitary, bored French policeman who passes the time chatting to the local concierges. Certainly a contribution from Washington would help with what must be a very high rent for this apartment alone.

But the New York Times article said its sources hinted that the CIA links with Madani were much closer than those with Aryana, whose organisation was originally monarchist but who dropped the link. Reporter Gelb gives some hint, perhaps, as to why Azadegan and several others suddenly dropped the reference to the monarchy in their manifestos and the disappearance of the imperial crown--soon, if we are to believe reports, to be sold to keep the mullahs supplied with Israeli eggs--from their logos: apparently the Americans won't pay the monarchists and their supporters and to qualify for a remittance you have to renounce support for the Shah and his crowd.

Besides supporters of the Shah poor Bani-Sadr and friends of the former president are also, if we are to believe the Gelb report, barred from getting any dinner money. The grounds for this unfairness are that people (unidentified non-American sources whom Washington must hold in high regard) are "concerned about any U.S. identification with exile leaders who have no chance of gaining power in Iran." How considerate of those non-Americans that they should worry about the U.S. image to that degree.

There is no mention of Shahpour Bakhtiar's National Resistance Movement of Iran or the Mojahedin in the article. Could they be the non-American sources so anxious that Washington should not tarnish its image? Rajavi's activists did murder one or two Americans working in Iran in the 1970s, as well as the odd hapless policeman, but there was obviously no real hard feelings behind the killing of these Americans. It was just a one-off, or perhaps seven or eight-off thing. Possibly it was all a mistake...

Now according to the New York Times' sources the CIA is not supplying any arms to the forces in eastern Turkey, and they definitely have no heavy arms. Yet they are supposed to be ready to be useful in "harassing the flanks of Soviet armed forces that might invade Iran." What with--catapults? Or would they hurl Turkish delight at the Soviet tanks?

Gelb wrote, "It could not be learned authoritatively whether the government of Turkey is aware of the presence of these units on Turkish soil near the Iranian border." Well, if the CIA, with its recent track record, is aware of them one can be pretty sure that even Gambia's secret service has that information, too. And it follows from this that even in Ankara somebody must have noticed if 10,000 foreign military men are gathered in one area of the country.

Actually, the whole article sounded as if the writer wandered into a New York bar and met Raji Samghabadi, the former Kayhan writer who now occasionally enlivens Time magazine with satirical snippets about Russians with snow on their boots appearing in Iran, and had only a hazy recollection of what he had told him. Iran and Iranians do not seem to be subjects Gelb knows much about and his confusion was very obvious in his article. Sometimes one couldn't make out in the Herald Tribune version whether he was contradicting himself or the paragraphs had merely got out of order.

But a great proportion of reporting in the West on Iran is of much the same level of incompetence and inaccuracy. And while Iranians continue to opt for abusing one another in Persian when they go into print instead of trying to correct foreigners' impressions in their own languages then the situation seems likely to remain that way.

CSO: 4600/349

RAJAVI INSISTS KHOMEYNI REGIME WILL FALL SOON

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 pp 9-10

[Text] Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi says his organisation is not disappointed by its failure to bring down Ayatollah Khomeini so far, and predicts he will fall soon in an interview in this month's Middle East magazine published in London.

The interview by Philip Marfleet, one of the better-informed commentators on an Iranian scene singularly ill-served by Western press correspondents, was one of the most searching that Rajavi can have faced. He came out less than convincing when questioned about his claims and the results which have failed to match them.

Rajavi told Marfleet, "Our offensive was successful; it was a great victory. In fact we did not expect Khomeini to fall; our intention was to present the slogan 'Death to Khomeini' to the people. The great majority of Iranians now support this idea wholeheartedly. Even in south Tehran--supposedly a Khomeini stronghold--the walls are covered with this slogan.

"It is true, of course, that this effort was bought at great cost to life. Usually slogans are written in ink. This time it was written in our blood. Khomeini is a man covered in our blood.

"No, we have not broken the terror. Though we were successful at first in shaking the regime to its very foundations, the brutality of its methods has surprised us," Rajavi replies.

Marfleet pointed out that the Mojahedin's September offensive was accompanied by calls for strike action against the regime throughout Iranian industry. Why, then, in Rajavi's opinion, had such strikes not materialised?

"I asked first for preparation for strikes and demonstrations," Rajavi insists. "For months we have been preparing, and in fact we can now see the results of our work.

"Though the Western press remains hypocritically silent on these matters--compare its coverage of the events in Poland with the carnage in Iran--we know of a wave of strikes. We know of the arrest of over 200 workers at the

Iran National car plant. We have reports of strikes among the dockers and among workers in Shiraz. The commanders of the pasdars, the revolutionary guards, are continually complaining of our presence in the workplaces."

Rajavi's apparently sudden declaration of hostility towards Khomeini last summer--after two and a half years during which he had spoken of the Ayatollah in the most generous terms--had caused some to accuse the Mojahedin of switching horses, Marfleet pointed out.

Rajavi denies any inconsistency. "We have been 100 per cent anti-Khomeini from the beginning," he says. "We have never supported him. We never voted for his various nominees, for example."

But the Mojahedin's own propaganda suggests otherwise, Marfleet said. In 1979 Rajavi greeted the Ayatollah warmly: "Long live the Imam Khomeini--the Great Ayatollah Khomeini." Rajavi is unmoved. "I was misquoted," he told Marfleet.

Rajavi is still elaborating a strategy that has been attacked from both the right and the left in Iran. "We have had enormous problems in dealing with Khomeini. Remember that this man is 80 years old, a faghih (senior theologian), the figurehead of the revolution," he told Marfleet.

"We needed great patience to prove our sincerity, to show by day-to-day work that he was the guilty one. We were polite; we showed that we were not guerilla adventurers, that we were logical, progressive, democratic; that we are the real Muslims.

"I insist that it was only people outside Iran who were confused about what we were doing. It was quite clear to all Iranians inside the country that we were the main opposition--after all Khomeini never stopped attacking us."

Some Mojahedin have hinted that their organisation is no longer prepared to wait for Khomeini to die. If Rajavi is convinced that the Ayatollah's death would result in the regime's collapse, would he accept their suggestion that it would be logical to kill Khomeini now, Marfleet asked.

Rajavi maintains that the Mojahedin still prefer to keep Khomeini alive for a television trial. But he also emphasises, significantly, that "there is no ideological or political barrier to punishing Khomeini himself." Rather, it seems, the barrier may be the dense cordon of revolutionary guards surrounding Khomeini's residence at Jamaran, Marfleet said.

Only two things can prevent Khomeini's fall, says Rajavi. "One is a miracle; the other is the intervention of a foreign power." He refuses to speculate on whether the Soviet Union has plans to take a direct initiative in Iran, but is contemptuous of their supporters in the country, the Tudeh Party, who had captured many positions in the regime's administration before the recent attempted purge of many of their leading members.

"But any intervention by a foreign power, or by a group like the Tudeh, can have only one result: the disintegration of Iran. We are the only force

that can unite the country. Who else could unite Bani-Sadr on the one hand, and the Kurdish Democratic Party on the other? Who else could bring together both religious and secular groups, Rajavi asked.

"Early on in the revolution Hani al-Hassan, the PLC representative in Tehran, came to me. He asked a question: 'How long do you think this regime will last?' I told him that Khomeini would be gone in between two and four years. Hani would not believe me. 'Don't you mean 10 to 15?' he said. I insisted on two to four. Nothing has changed my mind. Our strategy is working. Soon he will fall."

CSO: 4600/349

BALUCHI SPOKESMAN ASSAILS KHOMEYNI, ZIA

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 p 8

[Text] A Baluchi spokesman has criticised reports by the Western media to the effect that Baluchestan has become a major source for smuggling of hard drugs to Europe and America.

"The Western media is accepting lies fabricated by Iranian and Pakistani bigots," the spokesman said. "Both the Khomeini and the Zia-ulHaq regimes tell blatant lies in an effort to justify their policy of genocide in Baluchestan," he said.

He claimed that there was close cooperation between the Pakistani regime of Zia and the ruling mullahs in Iran which made "life for Iranian Baluchis unbearable." He did not know how a regime like that of General Zia, "which received billions of dollars from Washington, could so closely cooperate with the red Iranian mullahs whose main occupation in life is to kill innocent people and curse America." He contended that the two so-called Islamic regimes were united in killing Baluchis, starving their dependents to death and then blaming them for an increase in narcotics smuggling.

"If you look at records of the Anti-Narcotics Department of the Iranian police under the Shah you will see that there was no smuggling by us," he said. "There were Afghan and some Kermani smugglers but not Baluchis. It is true that some of us made a living from smuggling but that was smuggling of cigarettes, transistor radios and some garments. In fact, the Baluchis used to fight opium smugglers."

The spokesman said that Khomeini hated the Baluchis because they "looked down on him and his outlaws both when he was in exile and when he grabbed the mantle of office."

"I must admit that most of our tribal leaders are strongly pro-Shah and so are many of the ordinary people," he said.

"The Shahbanou (Empress Farah) took a keen interest in the development of Baluchestan," he said. Several irrigation projects, agricultural development schemes, an immense port development and naval base project and a university were under way and for the first time in many generations life for the

ordinary Baluchi was beginning to look hopeful. We used to supply sheep to the army, sell tropical fruits in Tehran and our men were at work getting wages for the first time; even Baluchis from Pakistan used to come here for work."

However, he said the advent of Khomeini had stopped all that and his rule had brought back impoverishment to all Baluchestan.

"Now he has cooked up this lie about us and he is paying Zia to obtain his help against us," he said. "The real dope smugglers are those mullahs who sent Abu Sharif (a former revolutionary guards commander) here to organise a lucrative opium smuggling business for himself and those mullahs like Khalkhali (hanging judge), Kerman Friday prayer leader Fahim and Isfahan Friday prayer leader Taheri."

The spokesman said Baluchi tribesmen were still pro-Shah and that they would not allow Khomeini's gunslingers to settle in the area. In Tehran last week the spokesman for the revolutionary guards announced that 200 Baluchi opium smugglers who, he claimed, were in league with Afghans, were killed in a gun battle recently. The spokesman said large quantities of heroin were discovered. But he did not say where the heroin originated. Tehran radio announced last weekend it had arrested 2,400 people in Baluchestan. Observers were sceptical about the figure--"unless they're just collecting up a crowd to make up the 10,000 they claim they'll release for the New Year."

CSO: 4600/349

SCORES KILLED IN URUMIEH ROUND-UP

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 pp 7-8

[Text] Islamic authorities in West Azarbaijan have carried out a massive "clean-up" operation against the farming communities around Rezaieh (now renamed Urumieh) and nearby areas, in a hunt for monarchist activist, reliable sources reported last week.

Scores of civilians, including women and children, were killed in swoops by the Khomeini gunmen on villages in the Sir, Sero, Coy-Tapeh and Gosh-Daghi areas, an informant from Rezaieh told IPS. The killings took place between February 24 and March 3, when Kurdish mercenaries in the pay of the Bassij (Mobilisation Organisation) were ordered to attack villages in the vicinity of Rezaieh.

"The inhabitants originally mistook the invading killers for friendly Kurdish neighbours," the informant said. "That explains why the victims took no precautionary measures against the attackers." The operation was masterminded by a notorious gang leader known as Mollah Hussani, who has been sent to the Majlis by the regime as deputy for Rezaieh. He dons clerical gown and head gear, while slinging a submachine gun on his shoulders. He is said to have lost his eldest son in battle.

At this time of the year much of the region is covered with snow and few outsiders usually visit the snowbound villages.

It seems the mullahs launched their surprise attack against the villages in an effort to arrest a Colonel Ghaderi and a Captain Nakhjavani, two former officers said to be carrying out operations against the revolutionary guards. However, the mullahs' information was inaccurate since both officers and their followers have not been seen in the area since last summer. At one time two months ago they were reported to have been sighted around Hamadan and Bijar.

In any case the mullahs brought in Kurdish mercenaries belonging to the Ghiada organisation from Sanandaj to Rezaieh to launch their operation. Ghiada members were told they would be sent to fight big landlords, royalists and members of the Kurdish Democratic party. The mercenaries were promised 3,000 rials (\$40 at official rate) for each "counter-revolutionary" they killed.

But the operation was badly organised and many women and children were caught up in fighting. Most of the victims were non-Kurdish sheep farmers but there were also Kurdish farmers among the dead. The mercenaries finally retreated to the city bringing back with them a number of prisoners. According to Kayhan newspaper last week 400 "elements of royalists, followers of the Kurdish Democratic party and big landlords" have been arrested. Informed sources said that the Kayhan report was referring to the sheep farmers arrested by the Khomeini mercenaries. The paper did not refer to scores of dead in the operation.

Rezaieh is a stronghold of the royalists and nationalists in Azarbaijan. Since the revolution several hundred are said to have been arrested and executed by Mollah Hossani's gunmen. But the populace continues putting up stiff resistance. On Khomeini's orders several hundred Palestinian mercenaries were stationed in Rezaieh in the summer of 1979 to guard the city. They were presented to the people not as Palestinians but as Shi'ites whom the regime claimed were expelled from Iraq.

So far Kurdish organisations in Europe have not issued any condemnation of the recent killings in Rezaieh, ostensibly because the majority of the victims are not Kurds.

Tehran radio also reported arrests of 24 alleged monarchists in Gilan.

CSO: 4600/349

KILLINGS OF KHOMEYNI SUPPORTERS CONTINUE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 pp 6-7

[Text] Armed opponents of Iran's theocratic regime have resumed their systematic campaign to eliminate middle and lower rank officials in Tehran and provinces. This is evident in newspaper reports as well as in notices for memorial services of the victims.

According to Ettelaat three members of the University Mobilisation Council were gunned down by terrorists armed with submachine guns on Deyhim Avenue of Tehran. The three men were identified as Mohammad Ali Namazzadeh, Hossein Ali Shayesteh and Hossein Rezai. Ettelaat, which printed the news three days after the killings happened, claimed that the terrorists wore air force uniforms and were driving a stolen car. They managed to escape, the paper said. It described the victims as "very good hezbollahis," meaning they were staunch supporters of Khomeini.

Another member of the University Mobilisation Council, Abbas Chamran, was also reported dead by the paper. He was the brother of Mostafa Chamran, a founder of the Lebanese Amal group, who was at one time defence minister under Khomeini and was killed in suspicious circumstances last summer. Abbas Chamran, who also died in suspicious circumstances, was a leading figure in the purge of university personnel.

Unidentified gunmen also attempted to assassinate the regime's chief of police, Colonel Ebrahim Hemazi, but he escaped with minor injuries. However, one of his guards died of his wounds.

In another incident, assailants fired at Mostafa Davoudi, the director of the Sports Organisation and a relative of Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, but he managed to escape unhurt.

None of the opposition groups outside the country has claimed credit for their attacks. The authorities in Tehran have, meanwhile, failed to attribute these attacks to any particular organisation. All the attackers are generally dubbed as agents of American imperialism and zionism.

Meanwhile, Tehran radio said 21 people were hanged at Tehran's Qasr prison last week.

PRESS BATTLE OF WORDS REFLECTS MULLAHS' RIVALRIES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 p 6

[Text] During the past four weeks a subtle battle of words has been going on between the official paper of the Islamic Republican Party (Jomhuri Eslami) and the Ettelaat newspaper.

Ettelaat, which is under the direct supervision of a mullah, Hojatoleslam Doa'i, regularly reflects the views of Khomeini's heir-apparent Ayatollah Montazeri and the theological teachers of Qom. Jomhuri Eslami reflects the views of Khamenei and his prime minister Hossein Musavi.

The battle of words began last month when Ettelaat carried an interview with a Majlis deputy, Hojatoleslam Yazdi, who is close to Montazeri. In this interview, Yazdi opposed the government's policies as infringing on the individual's right of ownership and insisted that Islam strongly supports ownership rights.

Soon afterwards, Jomhuri Eslami carried an item from an unidentified reader, who accused Ettelaat of sowing the seeds of dissent among followers of the Khomeini line.

Ettelaat's initial reaction was cautious; it simply went on the defensive for two days, arguing that the newspaper was reflecting the views of all factions who follow the "Imam's" line. But later the paper recovered its courage and reminded executives of the Islamic Republican Party that "even those who follow the Imam's line faithfully may help America, the enemy, by their bigotry, ignorance and narrow-mindedness."

Jomhuri Eslami retaliated by calling on Ettelaat to state its position on "vital issues" by a simple yes or no. Ettelaat's reply was subdued; it said that vital issues had many sides and one could not adopt a one-track approach.

The battle of words between the two papers goes on, but leading figures like Pafsanjani and Mahdavi-Kani have remained silent. Later last week reports said that Khamenei was trying to get a leading Qom theologian, Ayatollah Golpayegani, to enter the fray on his side.

CSO: 4600/349

SALES OF CONFISCATED VALUABLES DEMONSTRATE MULLAHS' FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 pp 4-6

[Text] Iran's theocratic regime has resorted to several unorthodox measures to delay total collapse of its finances, reliable reports from Tehran indicated last week.

One desperate measure is the sale of crude oil in the spot market, not at Rotterdam but in Singapore and Aden. It is reported that chartered tankers have taken crude for sale to Indian and Japanese buyers in Singapore and to unidentified buyers at the port of Aden. Prices were said to be around \$29 cash per barrel. The buyers were required to pay into a special bank account in Singapore, but no details have been available.

Another desperate measure is the sale of gold at a time when gold prices are at a record low. Ironically, the mullahs bought gold in early 1980 at exceptionally high prices on the orders of Bani-Sadr (then finance minister) and his Central Bank governor Ali Reza Nobari.

The gold, which was bought at over \$700 per ounce from the free market, was transported to Tehran at great cost. At the time professional cadre of the Central Bank strongly objected to the move but they were summarily dismissed from the bank by Bani-Sadr. Now the mullahs are said to be selling gold at around \$350 an ounce.

Some sources say Iran has merely "pawned" its gold, promising to buy it back in either three or six months' time. Up to 90 tonnes of its estimated 270 tonnes is thought to have been sold or pledged in the last three months alone, and sales are said to be continuing. An estimated \$100-150 million in cash is thought to have been raised.

Meanwhile, the mullahs have begun to sell antiques and valuable paintings they have confiscated from private collections of the royal family and scores of Iranians who have fled the country. Among items offered for sale are very rare carpets and rugs, fine art works, presents given to the royal family or statesmen by their foreign counterparts, and paintings. Many of these items were to be placed in museums but the revolution prevented this.

Many items come from the former Imperial Court's own museum or libraries. Some are from private collections whose owners invested their savings in them. Indeed, the public believes that some of the most expensive items have already been expropriated by Khomeini's son Ahmad and Montazeri's assassinated son (Ringo) and either sold or kept in their personal possession.

Reports that the Crown Jewels were to be sold were treated with scepticism by European art auction houses who will hope to make something from the sales. The announcement that antiques and valuables belonging to those whose houses have been confiscated has angered Iranians more than the news that the mullahs are selling the country's gold so dearly, and they are said to be checking already on goods reaching the auction rooms.

"This business of selling private people's antiques and valuables is degrading the whole country," a retired bank employee said in a letter to Free Iran Radio. "Khomeini has reduced the once mighty government of Iran to a renegade state which stops at nothing and resorts to daylight robbery," he said.

For their part the mullahs have begun to admit that their regime's financial position is grave. Minister of Industry and Mines Hashemi last week told a workers group that Iran needed \$7 billion in foreign exchange to supply its industry with raw materials and spare parts.

He blamed the late Shah for industry's dependence on imports and said the Shah did it to please the Americans. "Ever since the Shah has gone and we have cut our links with America that country's economy has been in ruins; so if we are to fight America we should do away with industries which depend on imported materials," he said. He also said Iran needed to export 1.5 million barrels of crude a day to meet the cost of the war and imports of essentials.

Central Bank experts, however, have compiled a report in which they argue that even the industrial plants for which raw materials are available at home are now running at 25 per cent of their capacity and showing a loss "because of gross mismanagement, lack of discipline and undue interference by irresponsible elements."

Meanwhile, the official spokesman, Ahmad Tavakoli, said last week that after the start of the new Iranian year on March 21 the state will no longer subsidise car manufacturing plants. Before the revolution the car industry in Iran was making enormous profits, most of which used to be re-invested. Today, despite several-fold increases in car prices and an import ban the industry depends on state subsidy.

The giant Iran National plant which assembles Hillman Hunters is now threatened by lack of funds, officials having failed, in spite of many requests, to open letters of credit which would enable the kits to be sent from Britain. Some 22,000 kits are said to be awaiting collection and officials are said to have refused to allow Talbot representatives to go to Iran to discuss the matter until the past week.

POSSIBILITY OF MOVE TOWARD MODERATE REGIME VIEWED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 pp 1-3

[Text] Are the majority of Iran's political leaders finally getting back some of their sanity and realising that they cannot survive unless they return some order and prosperity to the country?

Rumours that wiser counsels are prevailing among the clerical bosses of Iran seemed to be confirmed by the go-ahead given by Tehran's spokesmen for the Islamic Conference Organisation's mediation mission on the war with Iraq to continue their efforts to bring the two sides together.

Instead of a full throated insistence on Iran's demands being satisfied in full only a modicum of sabre-rattling accompanied Tehran's response to the initial visit of Guinea president Sekou Toure and his fellow delegates to Iran to discuss a new peace formula on Monday. Later the ICO expressed its satisfaction with the results of the opening contacts with Tehran and Baghdad and affirmed its confidence that the mission would find the much-needed solution to the dispute between two Muslim countries.

Sekou Toure himself also appeared much more optimistic than hitherto after the talks. When he left Baghdad he claimed peace was close. Observers felt the Iraqis had offered concessions that went some way to giving Tehran a solid inducement to soften its stand.

They obviously had; but Jeddah sources said on Tuesday that the main obstacle to a settlement was Iran's insistence on Iraqi troops withdrawing from Iranian territory as a prior condition for negotiations, while Iraq was insisting on negotiations starting first.

Saudi Arabia has already promised huge sums of aid to both Iran and Iraq to help them repair the ravages of the war once a peace settlement is reached, thus satisfying one Iranian demand that its losses should be made good. This demonstrates Arab fears and those of Riyadh in particular, of the further instability that continuation of the war can bring to the Persian Gulf region and of the effects of a possible Iraqi defeat. Other Gulf states governments have been noticeably hotting up their campaigns appealing for Islamic brotherhood and making reassuring gestures towards Tehran as to the prospects of co-operation once peace has been achieved.

It has been left to King Hussain of Jordan and other leaders further afield to send contingents of troops to help the Iraqis, largely as a gesture of solidarity. But Kuwait as well as Saudi Arabia has given considerable sums in aid to Iraq. Kuwait has also taken a leading role in trying to arrange an exchange of families for visits to Iran and Iraqi prisoners of war in the two countries, obviously endeavouring to use this as a further push toward the negotiating table. Kuwait will be the staging point for exchange of the families; it is estimated that 30,000 people will travel back and forth to visit an estimated 7,000 Iraqi prisoners of war and 3,000 Iranians Iraq says it is holding. Only a few details now remain to be ironed out, the Kuwaitis say.

The visit to Kuwait this week of Iran's foreign undersecretary Hussain Kazempour-Ardabili provided an opportunity for discussion on both bilateral relations and developments in the region, a Kuwaiti government statement said. Ardabili's colleague, Ahmad Azizi, was also busy talking in the United Arab Emirates. Arab sources said both Iranian officials explained aspects of the peace mediation and the regional situation for Arab officials. The Gulf Consultative Council countries' foreign ministers were also discussing the peace mediation in midweek.

The unusually animated coverage of minor gun battles and other violence in Tehran and other parts of the country by the Iranian media in the past 10 days have also given rise to speculation among Iranians that the government is anxious to divert attention from bigger matters, in this case the peace mediation. The details of attacks by counter-revolutionaries have shown clearly that the latter are now swinging back into action again, but previous policy of the government on information has been to play down the attacks of its enemies.

Though some people on Monday morning were predicting an early agreement on negotiations Iranian observers pointed to the reports of continuing fighting on several parts of the front as evidence that Tehran wanted to press home its reported superiority and gain yet one more tangible victory before it finally abandoned its obduracy. "They will try to achieve one more big success before they finally accede and then they'll get down to trying to win points round the table," one observer forecast. "They've little to lose, one imagines, in view of their military advantage at present."

Some Iran watchers also warned that the extreme radicals, motivated by fears that their position may be eroded by a return to normality, with trading and other links with the West resumed following any settlement of the war may come up with some ploy to compromise a settlement. They may also fear their clerical opponents may be able to utilise the armed forces after a peace settlement to impose their middle-of-the-road way and force the extremists out of their posts and their role in governing the country.

The trading and the middle classes, who have closer links with the armed forces than the extremists, are known to be anxious to see a return to a more centrist road and away from nationalisation as well as a return of normal life. There are fears among civil servants, already cut down by purges and resignations, that there will soon not be enough money to pay most of them

and they will find themselves out on the streets. Heavy pressure could be brought onto the armed forces to back the supposedly more moderate mullahs like Mahdavi-Kani and Rafsanjani, who control the Majlis, if there is a showdown for power between them and the radicals once the war is over.

While Khomeini still retains his power over the masses, the older clergy now see the middle classes and their aspirations as their main weapon in dealing with the younger and more fanatical mullahs with their radical ideas. They have already scented Khomeini's death in the not too distant future and are aware of the fact that the excesses committed by some members of the present regime have aroused widespread feelings of resentment against mullahs in general. While the majority of young people are still more interested in leftist rather than religious ideas the older mullahs in general are now looking to the long-standing clergy-business link as the key to saving the regime from succumbing to extremists on the left or right, sources in Tehran say.

Rumours are already circulating in Tehran that government changes may soon reflect a steady move towards the so-called moderate section of the governing clergy. Prime Minister Mir Hussain Mussavi is tipped as the first head likely to roll. He has been a disappointment to his own friends as much as to his opponents. President Khamenei may be hard put to find a replacement who will get approval from the Majlis and who is yet radical enough for his (Khamenei's) taste, some observers say.

With Kani and Rafsanjani dominating the Majlis and much of the administration, eroding Khamenei's power in charge of the executive would be the obvious aim for the moderates in consolidating their own power and to control policy. Creation of conditions in which many of Iran's business and professional brains can return and help get the country back on its feet along with those inside who cannot or who refuse to work, is seen as one urgent move to save the revolution. The moderates feel they could then rely on the support of this professional and business class and the hand of the nationalist opposition groups would be seriously weakened.

Tehran informants say that many of the mullahs fear the country can only drift into the arms of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc if it cannot find a modus vivendi with the Western world which will allow the reconstruction of the economy and of the society once again. Once that happens, they fear it will only be a matter of time before Soviet influence becomes so great the transition to a secular communist society will be an inevitability.

Thus, some people are now forecasting, some move against the regime's communist allies, the Fedayeen-e-Khalq and the Tudeh party, may well be engineered shortly. Although the Mojahedin-e-Khalq are still showing signs of life in widely dispersed attacks on lesser regime figures the government feels it has got the better of them. The Tudeh and its Fedayeen allies are seen as the only remaining dangers inside the country to the establishment of a relatively moderate Islamic regime, running a mixed economy in which the bazaar and other traders would play a traditional role, and which could work harmoniously with other Islamic regimes in the region.

IMPERIALIST PLAN TO REPLACE SADDAM HUSAYN DISCUSSED

GF260933 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0425 GMT 26 Mar 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] [Words indistinct] imperialist circles and world intelligence service to seriously think of replacing Saddam with someone else. These circles and echelons have become certain of Saddam's imminent fall after the latest operations of the soldiers of Islam on the Dezful and the Shush axes. What these circles have concluded from the number of the POWs--which exceeds 8,000--and the capturing of senior officers who used to engineer the mechanism of the aggression--is the collapse of the military apparatus of Saddam's regime, which is a prelude to the regime's final collapse. It has become certain that imperialist circles are thinking of ways to ensure their interests inside Iraq by replacing Saddam's ugly face with a person who will be acceptable to the Iraqi masses--provided imperialist interests in Iraq are preserved. This means another Saddam will take over in Iraq.

It has become certain that imperialist circles are extensively trying to carry out this move based on a number of facts which have been the result of recent military developments. The first fact is that Saddam and his rotten regime have reached the zero level of political reputation, massive support and military strength. The second fact is that Iraq will no longer be in the imperialists' circle of interest as soon as Saddam is out of the Presidential Palace and the revolution occurs. The third fact, which has been annoying the imperialists, is the inevitable establishment of an Islamic republic in Iraq. This means that the imperialist era in Iraq's bloody history will come to an end.

In view of these three facts, which are supported by evidence and proof, the circles of world intelligence agencies have begun to pave the way for proposing an alternative leader and regime to Saddam's regime. These circles are confronted with only two options.

The first option is to replace Saddam with a person who would outwardly appear pious and patriotic to absorb the masses' indignation and put an end to the war. In reality, he would be an agent of one of the intelligence

circles mainly directed by U.S. intelligence. This option has been adopted by the extremist wing of world intelligence. The other wing--which is characterized by political leniency--is calling for the second option: establishing a coalition regime as an alternative to Saddam's regime. This regime would include some Iraqi political groups. Through such a regime, imperialism would try to ensure its interests and placate the political groups in Iraq. The sensitive organs in Iraq--the oil ministry and the army and police commands--would be given to its agents who would be a part of the coalition government. Some minor responsibilities would be given to persons known for their piety to placate them and to make them subservient to the regime.

The establishment of an Islamic republic in Iraq will be very costly because imperialism is trying in every way possible to maintain its hold on Iraq's present and future. Imperialism will not easily give up Iraq and is trying to avoid the recurrence of another Islamic revolution. It is trying in every way possible to maintain its control over Iraq. Every time it finds itself in a dilemma, it resorts to one of the ways that will achieve its goals. These options will be the last guarantee for these circles after it becomes certain that the continuation of Saddam's control over Iraq is impossible.

The imperialist option will never be implemented without being accepted by the Iraqi masses. The people who have tasted the bitterness of imperialism for about 50 years will never accept imperialism's methods or plots. They will only accept the option that springs from their interests and future ambitions. The will of the Iraqi masses will be manifested in their choice of a leader, who will know pain and suffering in order to be a ruler and defendant of the rights of the oppressed people in Iraq.

CSO: 4604/24

MAS'UD RAJAI ON NATION'S LOSSES IN WAR

JN301633 Amman PETRA-JNA in Arabic 1545 GMT 30 Mar 82

[Text] Amman, 30 Mar (PETRA)--In its war with Iraq, Iran has lost more than 100,000 killed and more than 3 million have fled the country. Up to now Iran has lost more than \$150 billion in this war against Iraq.

This was announced today by Mas'ud Rajavi's office in a cable sent from Paris to PETRA.

Mas'ud Rajavi, the leader of the Mojahidin-e Khalq organization, said in his cable that the destruction from which the Iranian people are suffering is a natural result of the policy adopted by Khomeyni and some of his followers. This policy aims at keeping the Iranian people and army continuously engaged in other matters in order to draw their attention from the real crises and defeats facing the Iranians as a result of this stupid policy.

Mas'ud Rajavi added that the Iranian people and army are both looking forward to living in peace, love and cooperation with the other peoples in the region. Yet Khomeyni, Rajavi added, is trying to establish a rule led by fanatic mullahs whose hearts are filled with malice and hatred towards those who reject their backward policy.

Rajavi added that Khomeyni is not interested in peace or in cooperating with anybody. His sole concern is to repress the already stricken Iranian people and to continue the war with Iraq in order to keep the Iranian people and army always engaged in an unjust war and thus he can save his head as well as the heads of his agents.

Rajavi asserted that his organization firmly condemns Khomeyni's expansionist schemes and policy which continue at the expense of the Iranian people and army who are now engaged in this destructive game of war.

CSO: 4604/24

DETAILS ON ARREST OF 'MONARCHIST FEUDALISTS' IN URUMIYEH

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Mar 82 p 4

[Text] Urumiyeh - ETTELA'AT correspondent - A plot to overthrow the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran planned by monarchist feudalists in cooperation with fugitive officers and the dissolved Kurdish Democratic and Muslim People's Parties was discovered, and a number of monarchist nobles and feudalists were arrested by the Urumiyeh Revolution Guards.

Following their arrest, Engineer Sheykh 'Attar, governor general of West Azarbaijan, brother Sadeqi, the Urumiyeh Revolution Guards commander, Hojjatoleslam Imani, religious magistrate and chief of the city-region's Islamic Revolution Courts, and brother Jalilzadeh, Urumiyeh revolution public prosecutor, gave details of the plot in a press conference.

How Overthrow Scenario Discovered

In this conference Engineer Sheykh 'Attar first said: On the basis of information and news we had received, we sensed that the counterrevolution intended to begin new activities in this province against the rule of the Islamic Republic, not to mention its past wicked ones, by using several deluded stooges. Therefore, with the concurrence of the province's Security Council, we determined to turn these sick elements over to the law as quickly as possible.

Then the Urumiyeh Guards commander pointed to the circumstances of the arrests and the Guards' actions in that regard, and said: Following the murder two months ago of 'Osmat Khan Dari, one of the region's feudalists, information and evidence were obtained from his dwelling indicating that he was connected with fugitive officers and monarchists. Thus, by pursuing this information, we discovered a scenario to overthrow the Islamic Republic's rule, which was neutralized by arresting a number of its major actors.

As the conference continued, Hojjatoleslam Imani, Urumiyeh religious magistrate, also gave a statement in this regard, and said: A while ago we were informed that an individual by the name of 'Nazem', a fugitive general, had entered Iran over the Turkish border. After contacting regional feudalists and drawing them into overthrowing the government, he entered Urumiyeh. There he had discussions with several of his stooges. In this

connection, one of them named Iraj Tashviq was arrested during the course of an armed battle in the street. We obtained the names of the plot's agents and then moved to make arrests with the cooperation of the Guards. It is noteworthy that stooges from the dissolved Muslim People's Party had promised to cooperate with the monarchist nobles in this plot.

Charges Against Those Arrested

Then brother Jalilzadeh, Urumiyeh Islamic Revolution prosecutor, pointed to the charges against those arrested, and added: Among the reasons for the arrest of the feudalists are: Cooperating with fugitive officers to overthrow the government of the Islamic Republic, helping smugglers flee across the Turkish-Iranian border, making a center to produce heroin and narcotics in the region, chasing away oppressed Kurdish brothers and sisters and confiscating their land and property, cooperating with the dissolved Kurdish Democratic Party, and providing them with army weapons and ammunition.

He furthermore said: In this regard the Revolution Courts will treat those arrested with the greatest possible firmness, and will submit them to the severest possible punishment.

At the conference's close, the governor general of West Azarbaijan gave the good news that those driven out of the Kurdish regions who had recently settled in a little town on the outskirts of the Urumiyeh city-region would return to their original homes on the basis of a scheduled program and upon the establishment of complete security.

It is necessary to note that following the arrest of the region's counter-revolutionary nobles and feudalists, hundreds of Kurdish refugees put on a splendid demonstration in Urumiyeh's streets. They gathered in front of the Guards' City-region Headquarters and announced their support for the revolutionary actions of the Guards and other provincial officials. They issued a declaration which called for the firmest possible treatment of those arrested.

Support for Arrests of Feudalists

In connection with the revolutionary and Islamic action of the Urumiyeh Revolution Guards in arresting the region's nobles and feudalists, divinity students from the Imam Ghazali School in Piranshahr announced their support for the government's decisive actions and called for the punishment of the nobles and the complete implementation of the Land Reform Law.

A portion of their announcement reads: Each day that passes the Iranian Islamic revolution gains greater permanence through the removal of obstacles and the exposure of the enemies' multifarious plots. Another one of the Islamic and human actions recently accomplished by revolutionary institutions, the Urumiyeh Revolution Guards in particular, which has given new hope to the suffering Kurdish people, particularly those driven out of the Urumiyeh outskirts, is the exposure and arrest of the region's feudalists. We, divinity students from the Imam Ghazali School of the Piranshahr city-region,

while confirming (supporting) this action, call for the arrest and fastest possible punishment of other U.S. dregs and corrupt and traitorous nobles. We ask officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran to completely implement the Land Reform Law and confiscate the wealth of the plotters to benefit the oppressed. Thus justice will be done to the region's farmers who believe in the Islamic revolution, which is one of the wishes of Iran's people, particularly the Muslim Kurdish people.

Announcements from Revolutionary Institutions

The West Azarbaijan Land Ceding Commission also issued an announcement of their unsparing support for the prompt action of the Urumiyeh Guards Corps in arresting feudalists from the Kurdish areas of West Azarbaijan and the suppression of the counterrevolution. A portion of this announcement reads: We announce to our oppressed and plundered brothers in Kordestan that we, like other institutions of the Islamic revolution, are closely acquainted with your misfortunes and the plundering of your spiritual and material values. If the minimum conditions necessary to carry out our designated duties are met in the region, we will strive with all our might to implement the divine and justice-giving programs of the Islamic revolution. We are certain that the most fundamental message from our revolution's martyrs is the achievement of the rights of the oppressed, particularly the oppressed of Kordestan.

Reconstruction Crusade

The Urumiyeh Reconstruction Crusade also issued an announcement in this connection which stated: We announce our decisive and complete support of the Urumiyeh Islamic Revolution Guards, the revolution's powerful arm, the Urumiyeh revolution public prosecutor, the committed and ideologically pure religious magistrate, and the Hezbollahi, in connection with the arrest of counterrevolutionary feudalists the like of Rashid Bik and Haj Sami Honareh. We request the continuation of this Islamic and revolutionary action. We ask the respected religious magistrate for the greatest possible firmness in punishing these 'corrupt on earth', and enacting divine punishment upon them.

9597

CSO: 4640/197

RESULTS OF 3 YEARS OF KHOMEYNI RULE TALLIED

Brussels LE SOIR in French 15 Feb 82 p 3

[Article by Abed Attar]

[Text] Three years ago, on 12 February 1979, the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Khomeyni was born, after the fall--due to popular pressure--of the Pahlevi monarchy.

The following day--the 2d day of bloody riots (200 killed), the Supreme Council of the army proclaimed its "neutrality with respect to existing political rivalries" and asked troops to return to their barracks.

Then the chief of state, Gen Abbas Gharabaghi, went to Medhi Bazargan, head of the provisional government (designated by Ayatollah Khomeyni) to announce his support.

By sunset Shapur Bakhtiar, the prime minister placed in office by the shah 2 weeks before his departure on 19 January--when he went abroad for "an extended vacation"--disappeared into thin air (he turned up again later in France).

Thus the army, having got rid of the generals most loyal to the imperial regime, like Azhari and Ovessi (Bakhtiar made this a condition of accepting the shah's nomination), facilitated Khomeyni's triumph and that of "his Islamic revolution." The Supreme Council wished to "spare Iran anarchy and a blood bath."

Three years later, Iran is still floundering in almost complete anarchy, and every day brings its new quota of bloodshed: the blood of both opponents and supporters of the regime. According to official sources, there have been more than 4,000 summary executions and more than 1,000 people killed in the government camp. The country's future seems even darker. This perverted Islamic revolution is headed by "dictatorollah Khomeyni, the very same Khomeyni who rebelled in 1963 against the absolutism of the shah-in-shah.

On His Last Legs

The octogenarian imam's health is getting worse and worse, his heart is in critical condition, and his eyesight is extremely poor. He has yielded some of his constitutional powers--the Velayat-e Faqih (the supreme religious mandate)--to the national assembly, which was in conflict with the constitutional council about certain agrarian reforms. Furthermore, Khomeyni is grooming Ayatollah Hosseyn'Ali Montazeri, the imam of Qom, 60 years old, to succeed him. Last November he asked him to appoint the Supreme Council of Justice and supervise the Central Council of Revolutionary Guards, which is the regime's right arm. He is also encouraging the faithful to go to Qom to be blessed by Montazeri.

But it is not certain that this prince will be accepted by all the Shiite clergy, which is divided into several clans. There is the Turkish strain and the Persian strain, the Black Turbans (the descendants of Ali, the first Shiite imam) and the White Turbans, not to mention the progressives and conservatives, pragmatists and purists. One of the latter is Ayatollah Mahmud Halabi, who is already contesting the Velayat-e Faqih of Khomeyni, as are many of his peers. He is particularly critical of Khomeyni for having come to terms with the communists of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party.

And it is this virtual alliance which enabled the Tudeh Party to considerably increase its membership--by 1,000, according to American sources--at the beginning of the revolution, bringing it to more than 100,000. According to the deposed president Bani-Sadr, Khomeyni is the toy of a "bank of imbecile fanatics" who are themselves manipulated by the communists. The Tudeh Party is in fact suspected of being behind the efforts to discredit moderate laymen; it is also suspected of collaborating in witch hunts against the Mojahedin (progressive Moslems).

At any rate the regime is beginning to turn against this "objective" ally. The chief prosecutor of the revolution, Hojjatoleslam Musavi Tabrizi, has stated that supporters of pro-Soviet groups who had infiltrated the government should renounce their affiliation or be condemned to death. Tudeh militants are said to have been arrested, and some of the Tudeh party leaders are said to have gone underground: this is the case of Secretary General Nureddin Kranuri and the party ideologue Ehsan Tabari. The press has followed suit. The daily paper KEYHAN on 5 January asked the directors of the Tudeh party "to abandon--if they are honest--this Stalinist party which is completely subservient to Moscow, and serve the people and Islam."

After Khomeyni

Isolated, the integrationists are thinking seriously about what will happen after Khomeyni. Their enemies in exile are thinking about the same thing. The monarchists, led by Gen Bahram Aryana, who have training grounds at the Turkish-Iranian border and--according to the British press--the complicity of the Turkish authorities, make no secret of their intention of penetrating Kurdistan and Azerbaijan immediately after Khomeyni's death.

One thing is certain, and that is that the imam's death will be the point of departure for a real civil war between monarchists and the Mojahedin with their allies like the Mossadeghists and the Kurds--united in the National Resistance Council--the communists, and Khomeyni's last supporters. Only the army could save the country from a blood bath by quickly taking over the whole country in this fight for power.

But the army has been at the front since Iraq's attack in September 1980. Observers have noted in the Teheran press and in the statements of Iranian leaders a less intransigent tone of voice about this conflict, which has already caused 50,000 casualties between the 2 sides. The government has also recently asked the new secretary general of the United Nations, Perez de Quellar, to facilitate visits to prisoners of war by their families. Baghdad immediately agreed to this proposal. According to the International Red Cross, Iran has 7,000 Iraqi prisoners and Iraq about 2,500 Iranian prisoners. Perez de Quellar, who has concluded from this fact that the two sides are interested in a new mediation effort, intends to ask Olof Palme, the former Swedish prime minister, to resume the task that was entrusted to him by the former secretary general of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim. This mission failed, as did other attempts by Islamic and nonaligned countries, due to the rigidity of Khomeyni: no negotiations before the withdrawal of Saddam Hussein's troops.

The Regime Sells 75 Tons of Gold

In the economic arena, the war is costing Iran more and more as it attempts to purchase weapons, munitions, and spare parts on the international black market. Its annual income from petroleum (production is estimated at 1 million barrels per day, 600,000 of which are exported), which amounts to \$7 billion, is practically the only revenue the country has. It is not enough to cover imports, which are estimated at \$10 billion. Foreign exchange reserves have dropped to about \$1 billion; according to banking circles, the regime has had to sell 75 tons of gold.

Iraq, which is heavily in debt to the Gulf area countries (to the tune of about \$12 billion) has indicated, for its part, signs of flexibility. The Saddam Hussein government expressed the wish to see this war ended before the nonaligned movement summit conference, which is to take place in September in Baghdad. According to the ECONOMIST of London, Iraq has also informed the secretary general of the UN that it is ready to withdraw its troops from Iran on one condition: Iran, after that withdrawal, would have to commit itself to discuss the question of Iraq's sovereignty over Shatt-al-Arab and other minor territorial claims.

The whole problem for both Teheran and Baghdad is to find a way to make peace without losing faith.

9855

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CLERICAL REGIME SAID TO BE 'ON EDGE OF ABYSS'

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French, Winter 1981/82 pp 271-281

[Article by Amir Taheri, former editor-in-chief of the Iranian daily KAYHAN*]

[Text] The Iranian Islamic revolution is the first classical-style revolution to be born, almost literally, before television cameras, with the international mass media playing the role of midwives and skeptical witnesses. It is at least in part for this reason that most people expect the Islamic revolution to run its "normal course" as quickly as it was born. They expect Terror and Thermidor to follow in succession in Iran, from one news broadcast to the next, and thus to allow a busy world to turn its attention to the other problems of the times.

The Islamic revolution also is almost certainly one of the most misunderstood revolutions in contemporary history. Striking the world like a tornado, emerging from nowhere, it doesn't fit the mold of any of the "standard" descriptions reserved for social-political upheavals of this size. For the Western intellectual, there can only be either a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution or a "proto-proletarian" revolution. On the Left Bank they are still quite dismayed that the Islamic revolution has obstinately refused to follow the path that Michel Foucault and more than one minor saint had traced for it. At the end of 1981, close to 3 years after the fall of the Shah, the world seems to conclude unanimously--sometimes with joy, sometimes with true sorrow--that what it had acclaimed as the "dawn of freedom in Iran" strangely resembles a large wave of medieval obscurantism sweeping down upon the planet. The Islamic revolution has failed: that is the general sentiment.

However, if the facts were to be more closely examined, it would be seen that this Islamic revolution has achieved some success with regard to the central goals which it set for itself. Although some fools have not hesitated to describe the Ayatollah Khomeyni as the "Gandhi of Islam," the

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"supreme leader" cannot be blamed for this. For even a quick glance at his few writings would suffice to prove that he wanted power, all the power and nothing but power. And it would have been understood earlier that he was ready to coin the now-famous slogan: "To kill and to be killed is the principal duty of Muslims." This occurred in 1963, when Khomeyni tried for the first time to seize power in the name of the Shiite clergy.

If we discard the many images of the Islamic revolution as it may have been falsely depicted on the outside, the goals of the movement can be summed up as follows: First of all, the Iranian national state, created on the basis of Western models, thanks to more than a century of struggle by successive generations of Iranians who wanted to reconcile their country with the modern world, had to be destroyed. Islam does not recognize the existence of national states. In fact, none of the Muslim languages has a word for "nation" or "nationalism." Muslims belong to an "Umma" (community of believers) and should have a single world government under the "Imam," according to Khomeyni and under a "Caliph," according to his Sunni counterpart. The second objective of the Islamic revolution was the liquidation of the Iranian middle classes, judged to be "carriers of the Western malady within the body of Islam," in Khomeyni's words. The fact that certain sectors of the Iranian middle classes cooperated with Khomeyni and, when the crisis arose, acted as a Trojan horse against the Shah's besieged and disoriented regime should not fool anyone. Let us repeat: if these groups had made an effort to study Khomeyni's "works," they would have quickly learned what awaited them. These two goals--destruction of the Iranian national state and liquidation of the middle classes--were clear enough in the minds of Khomeyni and his close associates, such as Ayatollah Morteza Motahari, Ayatollah Mohammad-Hossein Beheshti, and others still who planned and guided the Islamic revolution. On the other hand, what was not clear and still isn't, even to Khomeyni and the members of his entourage (which is shrinking, besides), was what should replace the national state destroyed by the revolution. And it is at this point that the Islamic revolution sees its future becoming darker and darker. It is, in fact, beginning to feel like a comet hitting the world of reality at full speed.

The Islamic revolution was and remains a profoundly reactionary movement in the extent to which it ardently desires a return to the past. The modern world tends to entertain a certain fascination for the term revolution itself, which is assumed to announce desirable changes ("New World" or, better yet, "New Man" are the slogans which customarily transmit revolutionary faith). Even those who are counterrevolutionary by belief or nature do not dare to insult revolution, which, they think, is necessarily good and noble. So much so, that when a revolution proves to be an obvious failure--as do almost all revolutions--the shaken world emerges from its torpor and tells itself that that must not have been a "true revolution." At the least, revolution--which is supposed to resolve the contradictions of the existing society by creating a new "synthesis"--must, by definition, be progressive. However, the Islamic revolution openly announces that it is not [progressive], and that it rejects the idea of progress itself as an "invention of the Jews who want to destroy the True God," in the words of Attorney General Ayatollah Abdul-Karim Musavi-Ardabili. In a word: the Islamic revolution wants to go backward and return to the distant era of the origins of Islam and the Prophet.

How long will this attempt at a "great leap backward" be able to last? No one can say. What is certain is that the Islamic revolution, which succeeded brilliantly in destroying the Pahlavi regime, is obviously incapable of substituting another society for it. Its tremendous ideological poverty, its chronic incapacity to state clearly the questions it should be asking itself, and--this is significant--the inevitable backlash that its ruthless policy is beginning to provoke have reduced the chances of creating a society of which the Prophet would have been proud. But this does not mean that the Islamic regime is on the verge of collapse (while a dramatic ending would not surprise anyone).

The mullahs rule Iran today without being able to govern it. They are not strong enough to destroy their numerous opponents, who themselves are too weak to make a serious attempt to seize power. The result is a negative balance which could last for months, if not years. And like all other negative balances, this one has led and will continue to lead to bloodshed. The destruction of almost all institutions means that, for the moment, Iranian society does not have the means to impose true discipline over what has become a formless and bewildered mass. Iran is reduced to a geographic entity with "inhabitants" who, fighting each other while fighting the outside world, have not yet developed the myths, bonds, recollections, and common interests which are needed for the resurgence of a new nation capable in its turn of creating a new state that reflects its aspirations. This is a bloody interregnum, a void in the history of a people who--according to Hegel--created the first nation-state in the world. This is not the first time that such an interregnum has occurred in the long history of Iran. And to judge from past experience, it may bury an entire generation before it finally terminates. For the moment, the Iranian entity is reduced to its components as they have emerged from these past 3 years of storms and tension. Almost all of them, moreover, are battered by the tempest. But--whether we like it or not--it is around them that the new Iranian national state must be created, if the old empire does not disintegrate prior to this, anyway.

A dynamic analysis of these "components" is extremely difficult to make today, basically because a number of them are not yet aware of what they need in order to become active subjects of history as it is evolving. This is the reason why the country, on the verge of civil war for several months, has not yet crossed the Rubicon. Much blood has been shed, and continues to be, but it is virtually impossible to designate camps confronting each other along clear lines, as one could in a classic civil war. Sometimes the gratuitous bloodshed among the ruling clergy and its trigger-happy opponents has appeared more like a political version of a "gang war" than the violent impact of conflicting visions of society. We have already mentioned that the Iranian clerical regime has not, as yet, produced a coherent vision of the system they are praying for. But, to be objective, we must admit that their opponents have done no better. Almost all the political parties and groups in Iran seem to be reacting to events that they cannot control. None of them, not even Khomeyni's group, seem to have the initiative. All of them are living from one day to the next, allowing themselves to be carried by currents stronger than they.

But now let us make the inventory which we mentioned above.

The collapse of institutional power has led to the emergence of a variety of new centers of decision. According to conservative estimates, there are more than 700,000 weapons illegally in the possession of urban youth. The Iranian tribes, about 5 million strong, have again armed themselves and are vigorously contesting the authority of the central government over entire regions. Public officials, convinced that the mullahs will not content themselves with the purges that have already taken place, are doing their best to slow down--or even to openly sabotage--the administration's activity. The bazaars, powerful centers of commerce and finance in the cities, are refusing to invest, and thus are accentuating the economic crisis. The army, occupied in fighting the Iraqi invaders in the west and the southwest, now eludes the effective control of the mullahs in Tehran and is strengthening its own political image and prestige. The various paramilitary groups organized by the regime are engaged in open rivalry, and their respective leaders are acting like autonomous warlords whose only objective would be to assure their own share of power.

But the opposition is also fragmented. In almost 2 years of patient work, the exiled politicians have not even succeeded in creating some degree of unity within their ranks. As for the leftist counterrevolutionaries, they are still arguing over the validity of the strategy of direct confrontation decided on by the Khalq Mojahedins (Soldiers of the People) last summer. This policy--let us recall--led to the execution of some 3,000 antiregime militants and to the arrest of 5,000 others between June and October 1981.

The liberal opposition is also experiencing its own internal conflicts. The former prime minister, Ali Amini, seems to have succeeded in playing the role of a "bridge" between the monarchists, on the one hand, and some of Khomeyni's former colleagues on the other. Among the latter, figure Admiral Ahmad Madani, Khomeyni's minister of defense, and Hassan Nazih, who served as director of the Ayatollah's petroleum company for several months. The monarchist generals Bahram Aryana, head of the Azadehgan (Born Free) organization, and Gholam-Ali Oveissi also have ties to Amini. But the various groups brought together by Amini always vehemently refuse to join with Shapour Bakhtiar, due to the close ties existing between the former prime minister and Iraq.

And yet, a united opposition in exile could play a significant role by supplying inside opponents of the regime with the motivation they lack. More than 90 percent of the Shiite clergy, including five of the six Grand Ayatollahs, who represent the supreme authority in religious matters, are opposed to Khomeyni and his policy of direct government by the mullahs. A coalition of the anti-Khomeyni clergy, the army, the middle classes, and the leaders of the opposition in exile could therefore offer a credible alternative and form the nucleus of a future Iranian government. In such a context, even the leftist counterrevolutionaries led by Massoud Rajavi and the former president, Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr, could not be ignored. The task of recreating a new Iranian nation from the pieces of the old one is too immense to be undertaken by the liberal forces of the middle class alone.

A Pinochet-style government cannot be imposed, at least in the short term, because the leverage needed to put a military regime in place and to maintain it simply does not exist in Iran today. Again, only a broad antireactionary alliance, an alliance of forces devoted to progress and anxious to prevent Iran from returning to the Middle Ages, can hope to accomplish this mission.

The Khomeyni coalition itself is deeply divided. Here, two distinct camps exist: the first is led by the Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, who is often designated Khomeyni's successor as "Imam." This group is dominated by activist mullahs chiefly from the central and southern provinces. Its members believe in the free market and are in favor of good relations with the West. As for Montazeri, for several years he has been the spiritual leader of the Iranian anticommunist activists.

It was Washington's insistence on supporting nonclerical leaders such as Medhi Bazargan (and, later, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh and Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr) against the mullahs which gradually led to a break between the Montazeri group and the United States. This group sent very clear signals to Washington in the hope of being recognized as the legitimate heir to the Shah. But the United States, apparently anxious for the Shah's regime to be replaced by a "liberal" government which could be presented as a success for President Carter's human rights policy, persisted in betting on the wrong horses. The mullahs then realized that Washington wanted to help their enemies to prevent them from establishing the mullaharchy of which they had long dreamed. The hostage crisis completed the total break with America. But the Montazeri group--whose best known figure, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, was killed in an explosion last June--does not seem to have changed its deeply anti-Soviet position.

Its rival group, on the other hand, is convinced that the Islamic republic will be able to survive only through increasing radicalization of the revolutionary process and closer and closer ties with the Soviet Union and its allies in the Muslim world. This group is led by President Ayatollah Ali Musavi-Khamenei and basically is composed of Azari-speaking mullahs and politicians from the northwest provinces of Azerbaijan and Zanzan. It is this group which rules today in Khomeyni's Iran. It advocates Iran's participation in the "Arab Rejection Front," which includes Algeria, Libya, Syria, the PLO, and South Yemen. It has negotiated purchases of Soviet-manufactured weapons worth over \$1 billion from Syria and North Korea. This group also believes in closer ties with the small--but well-organized--pro-Moscow communist party, the Tudeh, which is the only nonclerical political faction to support Khomeyni. Tudeh feels that the central contradiction of Iranian society is the one matching the "masses" against "imperialism"; and it thinks that Khomeyni merits total support because he is leading the revolution which will resolve this conflict to the greatest benefit of the "masses." Finally, united with the Tudeh in their support of Khomeyni are a number of smaller Marxist-Leninist organizations which hope that, by jumping onto the bandwagon of the Islamic revolution, they will end up becoming its natural heirs.

The radical mullahs--who now control the government--the judicial powers and the leading party can still mobilize impressive musclepower in the streets. But they are no longer capable of offering the necessary ideological substance. The few Islamic slogans used by Khomeyni in his battle with the Shah have faded with time. And it is precisely there that the Tudeh and its Marxist-Leninist allies are coming to the rescue: in preaching class struggle, the elimination of the middle class, and an immediate redistribution of wealth, they intend to lead Khomeyni's republic down the "path to noncapitalist development." Such a policy naturally presupposes increased ties with the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. But it also proposes a dismantling of the regular army, once the war with Iraq is over, so that a new "army of the people" can replace it.

The Soviet Union has so far adopted a much more cautious attitude than its Tudeh proteges. It has even sometimes kept its distance from Khomeyni in order to keep several irons in the fire. In any case, it seems to us that the USSR is not seeking to actively influence the course of the Islamic revolution, contenting itself rather with encouraging its anti-American tendencies and exploiting the opportunities for progress offered to the "socialist camp." This cautious attitude--many Iranians believe--is due to Moscow's conviction that in the eyes of Westerners, Iran is still too valuable a stake for them to agree to give up. Furthermore, the Kremlin is not particularly anxious to find itself directly implicated in the volcanic explosion which the Islamic revolution has become. Convinced that time is on its side, the Soviet Union has adopted a low profile in Iran, leaving to its regional allies and local supporters the job of defending its long-term interests.

As for the West, it does not seem to have a coherent policy on Iran. There are occasional small intrigues (for example, the encouragement given to the Iraqi invasion) and pious discourses on the necessity of establishing democracy in Iran. Japan and West Germany are doing good business with the Islamic Republic, closing their eyes to the purely political aspects of the situation. France, feeling particularly favored because it offered Khomeyni hospitality for several months at the Shah's request, has even played the role of "bridge" between the new leaders of Iran and the West. But this link was broken when the French Government, convinced that there was some truth to the adage that "history repeats itself," agreed to take in Bani Sadr.

Since then, history has indeed repeated itself, but as a farce, just as Marx had predicted. The United States, traumatized by the hostage crisis and apparently not yet cured of the "Carter Lethargy," still does not seem to have a policy on Iran worthy of the name.

From all evidence, the new administration is anxious not to become engulfed in the Iranian morass which contributed to ending Carter's political career. And it is convinced--whether rightly or wrongly--that there is no solution for it other than either to participate fully in the Iranian game or to abstain totally. This is why, for the moment, Washington represents only a purely negative factor in this matter.

To be sure, no one wants to see Iran once more become a direct field of confrontation for the two superpowers. And this at a time when Soviet-American tension is reaching its highest level in a generation. But both within Iran and in this area of the world in general, the practical absence of Western policy toward Tehran is interpreted as a lack of interest. The Anti-Khomeyni coalition would need wide support from the West--if only to counterbalance the influence of the Soviet Union and its regional allies. The rapid decline in power and influence of the Pro-Western mullahs in Khomeyni's entourage is the result at least in part of their conviction that the United States and its allies have permanently written off Iran. Furthermore, the fact that the West has not thought it wise to send encouraging signals to Ayatollah Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi-Kani (who served as prime minister during the crisis last summer, marked by a renewed outbreak of street fighting and the assassination of many religious leaders) has also contributed to precipitating the situation. You recall: this Ayatollah almost openly called upon the West for assistance, asking it to normalize trade relations with his government and to help put an end to the war with Iraq. It is true that Mahdavi-Kani would not, in any case, have had the political weight and popular support needed to put the revolution back on track. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Western passivity accelerated his being cast aside by the radicals.

Iran and its capricious revolution are at the crossroads. One road leads toward further radicalization of the revolution and, over a period of several years, would inevitably lead to the establishment of a pro-Soviet communist regime in Tehran. If the mullahs pursue their genocide and blindly persist in rejoining the Middle Ages, most of the population, still deeply anti-communist today, will come to regard Soviet-style communism as the lesser evil, despite everything. Besides, thousands of young radicals, disappointed by the antediluvian aspects of Khomeyni's revolution, are presently turning to Marxism.

The second road (but this hypothesis is highly optimistic) could lead to the emergence of a more or less democratic regime in Iran--a regime capable of sufficiently uniting the nation's vital forces to buckle down to the formidable task of reconstruction. It could not--we must be aware of this--be simply a matter of restoration. Iran could not become America's favored ally again overnight. The tremendous forces unleashed by the revolution cannot be returned to the fabled bottle like so many genies. The left could not be banished by simple decree. The ethnic minorities could not be ordered to follow an almost Prussian overcentralization.

But despite all the suffering of these past 3 years, Iran could mobilize enough resources to solve its problems, safeguard its independence, and pursue a policy of friendship toward the West and coexistence with the East. The West in general--and we do not mean just the governments--still has a fundamental role to play in showing that it understands the crisis in Iran and wants to help put an end to it. Democratic parties and organizations, the media, the academic world, unions, and other popular institutions in the West could contribute their support to the forces of the Iranian liberal and democratic opposition. Close to 2 million Iranians

now live in exile, chiefly in Europe and the United States. They represent about 70 percent of the country's leaders and professional elite; without their support, nothing lasting can be achieved because, despite their physical absence, these exiles still play a key role: they shape the future of their country, due to the multiple networks of influence that characterize Iranian society.

The current revolutionary cycle will inevitably come to an end, thus enabling reconstruction of the Iranian nation to be undertaken. The democratic parties, supported by the anti-Khomeyni clergy and the new leaders of the army (who do not deny the reality of the revolution), could undertake this task. They could do it with the assistance of the middle classes and the industrial workers who have so far rejected both Marxism and Khomeynism. Does the West want to support such an undertaking? Would such a coalition receive enough aid to counteract the outside forces which are aligned behind Khomeyni today and which seek to assure the success of the Ayatollah's plan for medievalization?

The immediate outcome of the struggle for Iran depends on the answer to these questions.

9693

CSO: 4619/52

CLANDESTINE RADIO DISCUSSES IRAN-IRAQ WAR FLARE-UP

NC261523 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 25 Mar 82

[Text] Despite reports to the contrary by news agencies, the Tehran State Radio claims that the war on the fronts continues with full force, that during the past 24 hours more Iraqis were killed or taken captive and a quantity of arms and ammunition was confiscated. According to Tehran State Radio this war continues on the shush fronts. That radio also claims that several clergymen have taken up arms and are advancing at the fronts. We want to recall that so far not even one clergyman has either died or been wounded on the war front. This claim by the state radio--inserted between news items--is merely an endeavour to prevent public protest that clergymen and theological students do not fight to defend their homeland like thousands of Iranian youths. However, despite Tehran State Radio comments on the continuing intensity of the battles, reports received indicate that after 3 days of fighting the speed and intensify have now decreased on various fronts.

A Voice of Iran correspondent's report states that the most intense battles took place from midnight on Monday until a few hours after dusk on Tuesday and that the intensity started decreasing on Wednesday. In the same report our correspondent quotes an Iranian army officer who said that during these battles the most important objectives gained by the armed forces was to seize control of the strategic hills west of Dezful and the pass known as Reqabiyeh but that Iran's border strips in this area continue to be under Iraqi control. He added that despite the selflessness displayed by the Iranian army's enlisted men, officers and NCO's on the front lines, about 40 percent of the territories occupied by Iraq during the past 18 months continue to be under the aggressors' control, and if the Iranian army staff officers' proposals to give the military the war initiative continue to be ignored, it will be difficult to liberate the remaining 40 percent of the occupied territories and it will take a long time. According to this officer, despite the advice and urging of the military commanders, the operations commanders of the regime's revolution guards corps resort to useless and futile acts that only lead to the death of youths and waste of ammunition, which the Iranian armed forces needs very badly. He said: The need for war materiel and ammunition for the

Iranian army is today as important as breathing to live but the revolution guards corps shoots thousands of bullets, shells and missiles without any program or objective and actually gives the enemy the opportunity of preparing itself for confrontation and eventually for offensive operations. This officer condemned a person called Rahim Safavi, who is apparently the operations commander of the revolution guards corps on the front, for serving the enemy more than serving Iran by using elementary war tactics. According to this Iranian army officer no steps have been taken so far to place the corps' manpower at the disposal of the army and the military and under present conditions the war is expected to continue for some time in the same manner.

The report by the Voice of Iran correspondent states that another group of Iraqi POW's arrived in Tehran by train and were paraded to Sepah Square where they were taken to the officers' academy. Our correspondent says that residents of the capital welcomed the Iraqi soldiers with kindness and sympathy and some of the POW's had tears in their eyes, bowed their heads but several regime agents, like yesterday, were chanting pro-Khomeyni slogans at various points on this route and elevated him as high as God.

News agencies' reports indicate that in Baghdad too the state radio and television broadcast reports on the arrival of Iranian POW's and interviewed some of them. According to the news agencies, the Iranian POW's have said: We want the war to end and friendly relations with our neighbor Iraq. They also accused Khomeyni's regime of warmongering and said that when the regime moves away from peace, the Iranians are compelled to defend their homeland.

A warrant officer first class of the ground forces, speaking collectively for the 122d Battalion of the 7th Division said: We say that we do not have a war with the brother nation Iraq and upon Khomeyni's fall, fratricide will end too. This captive warrant officer has said: Captivity is a disgrace but I am happy that I am no longer killing my neighbor.

During the past 2 days the Iraqi regime too has claimed that it has taken thousands of Iranians as captives on the front and has invited news agencies' correspondents and photographers to visit these captives. Reporting on this, UPI reports that the Iranian POW's came through Baghdad streets in dozens of army trucks and it was announced that the new group of captives will be paraded on the streets in the same way. UPI also reported on remarks by Iranian Air Force pilot Kazem Khatam, who was taken captive when his plane crashed near Kirkuk. In an interview pilot Kazem Khatam spoke of the continuation of the executions, Iranian forces personnel being imprisoned and tortured by the Iranian clerical regime, adding that this has greatly weakened soldiers' morale. He also spoke about the intensified policy of suppression in Iran and said: No one has the right to speak and the people's lives are not safe. One of the correspondents asked about the execution of 9-year-old children by the regime. Pilot Kazem Khatam said: Personally I have not witnessed the execution of any 9-year-old child, but documents and pictures of these children who have been executed are circulating among the people.

CSO: 4640/221

DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI TANK INFANTRY BATTALIONS REPORTED

LD261150 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 26 Mar 82

[Text] IRNA correspondents at 2200 last night reported the latest enemy casualties and losses in the course of the [word indistinct] operations on the axes of Za'am (Ankush) and north of the (Refahiyeh River) as follows: according to this report in this region alone several enemy infantry and tank battalions were destroyed and the enemy's casualties were announced to be 3,500 killed and wounded. Also so far the forces of Islam have buried 350 bodies of enemy servicemen in a special cemetery after observing religious rites.

The report also notes the destruction of 40 tanks, more than 39 vehicles and 180 one-man and squad trenches among other enemy losses during the past few days' operations on the three axes. Also in the same region, four loaders and large numbers of Kalashnikov automatic rifles and heavy machine-guns were captured as booty by the forces of Islam.

During yesterday's operations by the fast flying pilots of the army air force the armor emplacements of the aggressive enemy forces were destroyed and huge losses were inflicted on their equipment. In an interview with IRNA an army air force operation officer, announcing the above, said: During these operations, which began at 0600 this morning with the participation of a number of army air force helicopters, our intrepid pilots, while destroying 20 tanks, 2 ammunition dumps, large numbers of light and heavy vehicles and several personnel tents, succeeded in wiping out the enemy's disintegrating armored brigade in the (Shamokli) region. He added: the enemy's morale has been completely weakened and enemy troops did not show the least resistance vis-a-vis the combatants of Islam, so much so that the intrepid army air force pilots together with three medical technicians from Ahvaz, following the completion of the operations, succeeded in taking captive 39 enemy troops.

In connection with the manner in which yesterday's operations were carried out by that force the army air force's operations officer added: these operations were very successful and truly remarkable and fast flying pilots of the army air force, apart from carrying out their own operations, also completed the work of moving the wounded and evacuating the prisoners.

CSO: 4640/221

CLANDESTINE RADIO REPORTS ON KURDISH LEADER'S BBC INTERVIEW

NC261727 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 26 Mar 82

[Text] The leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, Dr Qasemlu, has said in an interview in London that during the next couple of weeks he will publish the documents that he has signed with the National Resistance Council. In his interview, the text of which was broadcast by the BBC, Dr Qasemlu stated that the National Resistance Council's program for Iran's future will be clarified in these documents. He expressed the hope that in the future the activities of the National Resistance Council will not be limited to press conferences, but that the council will start an open war with Khomeyni's regime.

In answer to a question on the extent of the council's commitment to democracy, Dr Qasemlu said that he prefers a bad democracy to a good dictatorship, and as a sign of support for and commitment to democracy (?he referred to efforts) to grant freedom of activity to the Tudeh Party. He also pointed out that the achievement of democracy in Iran will be a very difficult task, because the Iranian people have lived under dictatorships for many years and the meaning of tolerating opposing ideas has been largely forgotten.

Dr Qasemlu said: Many of the Iranian people, particularly the middle class, think that since Mas'ud Rajavi is a committed Muslim and that Bani-Sadr cooperated with Khomeyni's regime, a regime like Ayatollah Khomeyni's Islamic Republic will come to power in the future. These groups should be convinced that this will not happen.

Speaking about the war with Iraq, Dr Qasemlu said: I am not sure that the victory declared by Khomeyni's regime is correct, because up to now no considerable change has taken place on the war fronts and [words indistinct]. The National Resistance Council, which considers war to be destructive, supports a peaceful solution to the differences between Iran and Iraq.

Dr Qasemlu said that 12,000 armed Kurdish Pishmarga are fighting opposite Khomeyni's revolution guards and the armed forces. He said that (?Mas'ud) Barzani's forces, which previously cooperated with Khomeyni's regime, have recently started fighting the regime's forces.

CSO: 4640/221

BANK OFFICIAL DENIES RUMOR OF LIBYAN LOAN

LD261050 Tehran IRNA in English 0950 GMT 26 Mar 82

[Text] Tripoli, 26 Mar (IRNA)--The governor of the Central Bank of Iran, Dr Mohsen Nurbakhsh, denied rumours spread by the Western news agencies that the Islamic Republic was intending to get a loan from Libya and he added that the purpose of his trip to Libya was solely aimed at strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries.

Dr Nurbakhsh who was speaking to IRNA on his second and last day in Libya, said further that such news agencies basically had made up many rumours against the Islamic Republic recently and they had been surprised by the victories of the Islamic forces since the Islamic Republic had not received any loans from any country. Iraq on the other hand, he said, had received more than 24 billion dollars of loans from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait.

Concerning his visit to Libya the governor said that he exchanged views with the Libyans on ways to struggle against the U.S. imperialism, which he said was trying to put pressure on countries such as Iran and Libya by creating a crisis in the world oil market.

Dr Nurbakhsh said also that for exchanging the experience of both countries, it was agreed a delegation of Libyan experts on behalf of the country's Central Bank would come to the Islamic Republic. He said that the governor of the Libyan Central Bank had been invited to Iran so that the two countries could expand their banking cooperation. Dr Nurbakhsh left Tripoli for Tehran last night.

CSO: 4600/362

IRAN

IRAQ REPORTEDLY SEEKING OVERSEAS RECRUITS

LD302222 Tehran IRNA in English 2010 GMT 30 Mar 82

[Text] Tehran, 30 Mar (IRNA)--The recent victories of the Islamic defenders in the warfronts have finally forced Saddam to call up Iraqi Baithists outside Iraq to replace tens of thousands of Iraqi forces captured or killed.

Saddam, after resorting to the induction of thousands of teenagers, young and elderly, now has ordered all Iraqi embassies to summon the Iraqi Baithists at the earliest possible time and to provide for their return to Iraq.

Central News Office dispatches indicate that in a circular signed by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces all Iraqi diplomatic corps outside Iraq were requested to ask all members and supporters of the Baithists Party to fill application forms for travel to Iraq, to be sent to warfronts after coming to Iraq and passing a short period of military training.

This order also added that the summoned individuals should be assured that it was not necessary for them to enter the war scene (?directly), but stressed that their presence beside other soldiers would strengthen their morale.

The same circular stated that all those students who were pursuing their studies were assured in case of interruption of their studies that the Baithist Party of Iraq would give them a 6-year scholarship enabling them to continue their study in the same country or another. The Iraqi regime recently called on all foreign employees residing in Iraq to go to the warfronts to meet the manpower shortages caused by the loss and capture of soldiers in the warfronts.

CSO: 4600/362

LATEST PETROCHEMICAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN REPORTED

London 8 DAYS in English 6 Mar 82 pp 54-55

[Text] Iranian-Japanese negotiations aimed at solving disputes over the completion of the petrochemical complex at Bandar Khomeini appear to be deadlocked. However, Iran, despite offers from other countries, is still trying to get the Japanese to resume the work, nearly 85 per cent of which has been completed on the 11 units that constitute the complex, with the exception of the control systems.

Negotiations between the two sides have continued since the Japanese abandoned the project 18 months ago. Recently, the Japanese offered to complete the project at a total cost of \$4.2bn but Iran insisted that the ceiling was not to exceed \$3.5bn. It also offered the Japanese a loan of \$351m to complete the work, but the offer has so far not been accepted.

Iran has seven petrochemical plants, including ones at Abadan, Kharg Island, Shiraz and Karaj which produce several kinds of fertilisers and chemical products. The deal to build the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Complex (IJPC) was concluded in 1971, when it was expected to cost only \$358m. Construction work began in 1973, with January 1980 as the completion date. The two partners, holding equal shares, were the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Iranian Chemical Development Company (ICDC), a Japanese group led by the Mitsui company.

According to official sources, Japan's primary interest in the complex lay in obtaining cheap supplies of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) at a price of two cents per cu ft at wellhead. An LNG plant was planned as part of the complex and it was estimated that, while 50 per cent of the LNG produced would be consumed by the complex itself, the balance would be available for shipment to Japan.

But as work proceeded, there were sharp increases in cost. The Japanese, fearing it would be uneconomical to continue, sought to withdraw from the project. After a long dispute, a settlement was reached in 1976 and a revised contract signed. The LNG plant was scrapped.

The Japanese abandoned the project during the revolution but were persuaded to return and resume work about 18 months later. In September 1980, the

Iran-Iraq war broke out, bringing work to a standstill. The complex also suffered some damage, described by Iranian sources as 'slight'. The Japanese again abandoned the project and have not returned though negotiations continue.

According to official sources, a number of countries have offered to step in and complete the work. The Japanese claim that the advanced technology they employed at the complex is beyond the capability of any other country, but this is not taken seriously either by Iran or by those now offering to collaborate.

However, Iran is still trying to persuade the Japanese to return, although it has stated categorically that resumption of the remaining work will not be undertaken on terms dictated by Japan, but only on those mutually agreed.

--The Iraqi National Oil Corporation (INOC) has offered India's Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) new drilling contracts for wells ranging in depth from 2,000-5,000 metres. In addition, INOC has asked ONGC to provide a seismic team, including data interpreters and trainers.

Iraq wants ONGC to study exploration possibilities in difficult geological structures and the feasibility of injection or miscible flooding in the stratified high pressure Yamma oil pools, southern Basra.

The two countries will also examine the improved recovery of high sulphur crude in northern Iraq, and the Delhi government is awaiting a formal invitation to help establish a research centre in Baghdad.

CSO: 4600/351

TURKISH GASLINE PROJECT SAID TO DISAPPOINT SOVIETS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 pp 3-4

[Text] The Soviet Union made new overtures to the mullahs this week when an article in Pravda remonstrated with those of Iran's leading officials who spoke of the USSR in the same breath as the United States, and pointed out that the Soviets could do a great deal more in cooperating with Iran than they were at present being asked to do.

No sooner had the article appeared, with the Western media giving it almost sinister connotations by featuring it so prominently in its broadcasts and journals, than a news item from Tehran gave one clue as to why the Soviets sounded like a lady who had been given an albeit gentle brush-off. Turkey and Iran announced the revival of a plan for a natural gasline across Turkey into Europe.

Nothing could have been more calculated to give Soviet economic officials dyspepsia. For they have ambitious plans for their own gas pipeline to Western Europe and Iran's natural gas, which they were utilising before the revolution but which has been cut off since because of a dispute over the price Moscow was paying, is needed to supply it. The French have recently announced their willingness to receive gas from the Soviet Union, a move which has sparked off annoyance in Washington.

It is barely two weeks since Iran's energy minister signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for Soviet cooperation in new energy projects in Iran and along the Soviet border. Although no announcement was made it was generally understood that an agreement in principle to resume supplies of natural gas to the Soviets had been reached, although no final accord had been reached on price.

Some Iranian officials had announced that agreement had been reached with the Soviets over gas supplies, but energy minister Ghaffuri-Fard denied that matter had been discussed. The Iranian official could have been standing off the Soviets, while awaiting the outcome of the talks with Ankara on the projected pipeline through Turkey.

Other deals agreed with a high-powered Turkish delegation to Tehran led by deputy premier Turgut Ozal, who is credited with being the brains behind

Turkey's almost miraculous stepping back from the brink of economic collapse at the end of the 70s, include Turkey's taking 4 million tonnes of oil and supplying 200,000 tonnes of meat, grain and sugar, and also additives for petrochemicals and other industrial goods in return. It was assumed the deals would be on a barter basis, although a Tehran announcement said Turkey would pay cash for its oil.

Before leaving for Tehran Ozal had told newsmen that one aim of his delegation's visit was to try to help towards bringing stability to Iran, which was interpreted by observers as demonstrating Ankara's decision to try to become an influential neighbour for Tehran. During the late Shah's reign repeated Turkish efforts to build up closer relations with Iran were unsuccessful in restoring the close links of the reign of Reza Shah, who was a firm admirer of Ataturk. Ankara officials privately expressed their chagrin over Iran's failure to value Turkey's friendship in the 1970s.

In its article on Iran-Soviet relations Pravda said Moscow had always supported the Islamic republic but progress in building up closer relations had been thwarted by whipped-up anti-Soviet propaganda. It was unjust to bracket the U.S. and the USSR together, it said, adding that communism and Islam were not incompatible and differences in ideology were no obstacle to good relations.

Iranian officials have kept up a barrage of criticism of the Soviet Union over its invasion of Afghanistan and have frequently bracketed, as Pravda put it, Moscow with the U.S. as imperialistic. They have accused Moscow of favouring Iraq in its war against Iran, though the Soviets have tried to be evenhanded in their concern to see the war ended.

But another obstacle to expansion of Irano-Soviet industrial cooperation, which the Soviets are pressing, is the poor performance so far of the Soviet-built industries in Iran, such as the Isfahan steel mill and the Arak machine tools plant. Other Eastern bloc projects, like the Romanian tractor factory in Tabriz, have also been widely criticised for the poor quality of their products. Even poor Iranians have an instinctive liking for quality goods, something that is indeed a national characteristic. And neither Soviet goods nor its drably-dressed and churlish nationals have much attraction for Iranian businessmen or their workers.

CSO: 4600/349

BRIEFS

DEATH OF SHAH'S MOTHER--Paris, March 17 (AFP)--The mother of the late shah of Iran, Taj-ol-Moluk Pahlavi, died recently in Acapulco, Mexico, without ever knowing of the death of her son in July 1980, the defunct shah's son, Reza, said in a statement here today. Taj died on March 10 from a heart attack. She was 90 years old. News of her death came only yesterday. She will be buried in a temporary tomb because of the "exceptional situation which currently prevails in Iran," the statement added. Reza Pahlavi also sent a message to "his compatriots" expressing his grief upon the death of his grandmother, the communique added. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 18 Mar 82 p 1]

PRICE INDEX INCREASE--Tehran, March 17 (IRNA)--The price index for wholesale goods rose 3.4 percent in the last Iranian month that began January 21 compared with the previous month. The Economic Statistics Office of the Central Bank of Iran issued the price index today adding that the increase between Jan. 21 to Feb. 19 was due mainly to an increase in the price of fruits, vegetables, and meat. Prices of other goods, such as grain and cereal, dairy, cotton, motor oil, brick, China and glassware, some chemical and petrochemical items, carpet, wooden and metal items, agricultural tools also caused the increase. The index shows an increase of 12 percent compared with the same period last year. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 18 Mar 82 p 2]

MEASURES FOR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY--Tehran, March 16 (IRNA)--The head of the Isfahan nuclear technology center Dr. Saidi said in Isfahan today that Iran was taking concrete measures for importing nuclear technology while at the same time utilising Iranian expertise in the field. He said the decision was made in the wake of discovery of uranium resources in the country and after Iran's capability for developing the industry had been established. Iran's plans for developing nuclear capability are conceived in three distinct phases: during a short-range plan Iran will design and manufacture a subcritical reactor, followed by a nuclear reactor and a nuclear plant during the subsequent mid-term and long-term plannings. Recently a budget of 220 million rials was appropriated for a short-term research operations in the field. Already a preliminary design of the sub-critical reactor has been completed and its detailed designing is expected to start out in later March 1982. Dr. Saidi said he expected the task would be fulfilled by September 1982. He said he was hopeful that in another six months Iran would develop a capability for producing uranium ingots. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Mar 82 p 1]

DOUBLE GOLD BACKING--Tehran, March 17 (IRNA)--An Iranian economic official asserted that the gold backing for printed banknotes in the Islamic Republic was doubled compared to that of the past regime. He further stressed that the economy of the Islamic Republic was not crippled. "Rather, it is the thinking and rumors of the counter-revolution which are crippled", added the official. The Planning Deputy of the Economics and Finance Ministry, Mr. Dizaji said yesterday in a gathering of the people of Yazd, 730 kms south of Tehran, that there were no difficulties in foreign currency holdings and the gold backing for the publication of banknotes was even more than the previous regime. He said that due to the treacherous policy of the former regime, there existed hidden unemployment. For example, he said Iran bought meat at 500 rials a kilo and gave it to the butcher for 80 rials a kilo and then the butcher sold it for 130 rials. Since the live-stock breeders could not afford to sell the meat at 80 rials therefore they were forced to leave their jobs and in this way agriculture was destroyed and the economy became a single-product (oil) economy. According to the Oil Company's statistics on the ousted regime, an amount of 6.5 million barrels a day was exported but this amounted to over 9 mbd. On the other hand, he said, 50 percent of the country's budget was allocated to the Armed Forces and SAVAK (the secret police of the shah's time). Another 35 percent of the budget was directly spent under the supervision of the defunct shah's consortium which administered 65 organizations. The remaining 15 percent was allotted for construction and administrative affairs, including agriculture, road construction, education, and most of this amount was misappropriated. The deputy added that whereas now, when the country was engaged in war, only 25 percent of the budget has been allocated to war expenditures and the rest was allotted to current constructive affairs. Mr. Dizaji stated that during the current Iranian year (March 21, 1981-March 20, 1982) 880 billion rials had been allocated to constructional budgets of which 570 billion rials had been disbursed so far, a 15 percent increase in comparison with the previous year. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 18 Mar 82 p 1]

DISSIDENTS IN UNIVERSITIES--Tehran, March 16 (IRNA)--Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, said in an interview that members of the four political groups, the Marxist Tudeh Party, the Marxist Fedayeen Khalq Organization (majority faction), and the militant Muslim movement, and a group known as the Mujahideen Khalq movement led by a former Mujahideen member who split from the group in 1975, could in his view be permitted into the universities to study. The speaker's statements were part of an interview he granted to the "University of the Revolution Magazine" added that these groups could study in the universities on the condition that they remain under strict supervision and not deviate the students in the university. About the first two groups he said that they are more concerned about things outside Iran's borders adding that one could ultimately understand that they were "almost Russians" but about the two other Muslim groups Speaker Rafsanjani said that while they were opposed to the political and social positions of the Islamic Republic, "at least in the past," and added that now they had modified themselves to some extent. Also, concerning political activity in the universities in the future Hojjatolislam Rafsanjani said that people at any age should not be deprived of political activity, but he said that it should not be deprived of political activity. He said that it should be understood that in a educational

atmosphere all priorities should be given to studies. He said that any moves which would slow down the flow of education should be stopped. "But we are not opposed to a student who is a political element, studies political books, has political discussions or has healthy political connections," he added. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Mar 82 p 1]

KHOMAYNI TAPES AIRED--Tapes of Ayatollah Khomeini speaking to three visiting delegations were played over Tehran radio this week to rebut stories still current in the Western media that he might be dead. He told a group of footballers they should publicise the Islamic revolution while they are away from Iran. Khomeini lost another of his prominent supporters on Monday when Ayatollah Rabbani-Shirazi, a member of the Council of Guardians, was killed while driving between Isfahan and Shiraz, according to Tehran radio. The dead man was regarded as a moderate. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 p 12]

BAKHTIAR, AMINI DISCUSSIONS END--Reports from Paris say a new round of discussions between Shahpour Bakhtiar's National Iranian Resistance Movement and Ali Amini's National Liberation Movement have again ended in disagreement. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 p 12]

CLAIMS BY U.S. FIRMS--Informed sources said latest information suggests no fewer than 1,087 claims have been lodged by U.S. firms with the tribunal in The Hague set up to consider Iranian and U.S. claims against one another. Iran's claims are said to number 1,100, though Iranian officials say they are nearer 2,000. In addition 2,795 American claims of less than \$250,000 have been submitted. One member of the Iranian delegation has resigned in protest, he says, against the attitude of an independent Swedish member of the tribunal. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 p 12]

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN OIL PURCHASES--Czechoslovakia has agreed to double its purchases of Iranian oil to 500,000 tonnes a year following recent talks between Czech and Iranian officials in Tehran. The sale will be on a barter basis, the Czechs offering industrial equipment and components, as well as petrochemical and chemical products. The Czechs may also purchase gas from Iran. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 p 12]

BANDAR SHAHPOUR PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT--Tehran sources said good progress had been made on completing agreement for the Japanese to continue work on the Bandar Shahpour petrochemicals project following talks between officials of the two countries. The cabinet recently allocated a sizable sum for completion of petrochemical projects. The Japanese side has been trying to persuade Iran to take over financial responsibility for completion of the complex so it can work in future on a contract basis, sources said. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 p 12]

MAJLIS DEPUTIES MEET GOLPAYEGANI--A group of Majlis deputies has met Ayatollah Golpayegani in a bid to bring about a rapprochement between the parliament and the Council of Guardians, who are reported to have been at loggerheads for some time. Observers see this as yet one more sign of political adjustment now going on inside the country. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 p 12]

MULLAHS SUPPORT SYRIA'S ASSAD--After a long silence the mullahs this week came down firmly on the side of Syrian president Assad when Ali Akbar Velayati, their foreign minister, fiercely condemned the violence perpetrated at Hama by Muslim fundamentalists. He said they should be backing Assad against the real enemy, Israel, and not fighting him. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 62, 11 Mar 82 p 12]

GDR ENVOY MEETS MINISTER--Tehran, 29 Mar (IRNA)--The German Democratic Republic ambassador to Tehran, Wolfgang Konschel, met and conferred with the minister of agriculture and rural development, Mohammad Salamati, this morning. During the meeting, in which the trade attache of the German Democratic Republic Embassy was also present, both sides agreed for cooperation in agricultural fields. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1932 GMT 29 Mar 82]

RICE PLANTING FIGURES--Tehran, 13 Mar (IRNA)--Over 1,100,000 tons of wheat have so far [been] purchased from Iranian farmers, announced minister of agriculture and rural development, Mohammad Salamati in an interview with IRNA today. Over 700 tons of rice seed would be distributed in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces next year to make a rise in rice production level and this figure is 20 times more than what was distributed in the current year, Salamati added. Regarding the lands under cultivation this year, Salamati recalled that in the current year, about 2 million hectares of land had been cultivated for various types of produce the output of which would increase remarkably in the coming 12 months. [Text] [LD140222 Tehran IRNA in English 1538 GMT 13 Mar 82 LD]

MAJLIS ELECTIONS--Tehran, 28 Mar (IRNA)--The Minister of Interior Nateq-nuri in an interview in Shahr-e Kord, Chahar Mahal Bakhtiari Province yesterday talked about the recent victories of the Islamic combatants in the Shush and Dezful fronts. He said that coordination between the Iranian forces brought them success and in the first day of Fath operations Iranian forces liberated 45 kilometres of Iranian occupied lands, and captured a large number of Iraqis. Concerning the Majlis by-elections he said that they would take place in late April. Nateq-nuri also said that a project was currently being prepared in the Interior Ministry on activities of political parties and any standards that the Majlis approved of would be carried out. Talking about counterrevolutionaries he said that the majority of them have been smashed and the remainder sometimes committed terrorist activities to prove their existence. About the exchange visit of POWs relatives he said that Iran has taken necessary measures and has announced its readiness to the International Red Cross but Iraq has not given any answer so far. [Text] [LD281204 Tehran IRNA in English 1035 GMT 28 Mar 82]

THIRD WORLD IMPORTS--The leader of the delegation to the international economic and social conference for Asia and the Pacific said in Bangkok today that the Islamic Republic of Iran will double its commercial exchange with Third World countries in order to decrease its dependence on oil. He added that since the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Iranian imports from Western countries dropped from 80 percent to 64 percent. Meanwhile, Iranian imports from Third World countries, especially India and Pakistan, increased by 18.5 percent between 1978 to 1981. [Text] [GF261919 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 26 Mar 82]

FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS--Following its previous statement calling on foreign correspondents to visit the warfront, the military information council has announced that the first group of these correspondents will leave for Iran tomorrow, Saturday, to view the latest victories of the soldiers of Islam. The new statement issued by the council in this regard said in part: All correspondents and agency, television and radio reporters who have an (?Islamic leaning) should announce their readiness to leave for Iran through Iranian embassies abroad. [Text] [GF260805 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 26 Mar 82]

GUERRILLA OPERATION--Tehran, 19 Mar (IRNA)--In a guerrilla operation conducted by the Islamic combatants of Iran in the front of Karkheh Kur, in Khuzestan Province, 250 Iraqi soldiers were killed and 30 others were captured. The guerrilla operation was the second stage of an operation called "Ommol Hossnein" (referring to the daughter of the prophet, Fatima (A.S.)), which was launched by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards north of Ahvaz last Wednesday. In that operation at least 103 Iraqi soldiers were killed, 13 were captured and many tanks, machine guns, mortar launches as well as bunkers of the enemy troops were also destroyed. The operation also marked the anniversary of a similar successful attack against enemy troops west of Susangerd. In today's operation 30 Iraqis, including soldiers and NCOs were taken prisoner and transferred behind the front. [Text] [LD192054 Tehran IRNA in English 1614 GMT 19 Mar 82]

'ARMS' SALE' RUMOR--Tehran, 26 Mar (IRNA)--The Voice of America, in its different Persian, English and Arabic broadcasts today, has revived its old rumour of U.S. and Zionist made arms supposedly sold by Tel Aviv to Iran. This futile attempt is once again launched to overshadow the news of the great victories recently achieved by the Islamic defenders of Iran in the battlefields of the Iraqi imposed war. At the same time it is trying to imply to those who have learned about the Iranian victories, that these victories are the result of U.S. and Zionist arms sales to Iran. It is expected that within the next hours, other beacons of news imperialism such as the BBC, Radio Cologne, Monte Carlo, Amman as well as the radio stations of France, the Zionist retime, Baghdad, Cairo and some other puppet radio stations will widely cover this Tel Aviv-Washington-Baghdad oriented rumour and through these biased propaganda seek to discourage the Muslim people of Iraq who are preparing to topple Saddam's regime without using arms or soldiers. [Text] [LD262048 Tehran IRNA in English 1949 GMT 26 Mar 82]

NUCLEAR CONTRACT WITH FRG--Tehran, 27 Mar (AFP)--Iran has signed an agreement with the Kraftwerkunion (KWU) Company of West Germany for completion of a nuclear plant begun before the Islamic revolution, the director of Iran's atomic energy organization said today. The nuclear plant, 70 per cent completed, has stood idle while Iran and KWU haggled over finances. Iran claimed 2.1 billion marks (875 million dollars) in damages for non-completion of the plant, while KWU demanded 1.8 billion marks (750 million dollars) in unpaid bills. Terms of the accord signed in Geneva last Tuesday were not

published, except for KWU's 16 million mark (6.66 million dollar) contribution toward transportation of necessary equipment to Iran. Commenting on the arrangement today, the director of the atomic energy agency here said the agreement was subject to approval by Iran's parliament, adding that all other nuclear projects undertaken under the pre-revolutionary regime had been scrapped. [Text] [NC271844 Paris AFP in English 1754 GMT 27 Mar 82]

IRAQI COMMANDER INTERVIEWED--Tehran, 27 Mar (IRNA)--Iraqi Commander Ayed Mahmud Ahmad who surrendered himself to the Iranian defenders near Fakkeh today said that Iraqi soldiers were all awaiting any opportunity and excuse so that they could surrender themselves to the Iranian defenders rather than fight on to the death in a war in which they did not believe. Mohammad Saleh, the 40-year-old commander of the 602d Brigade of Iraq, who is among the captured Iraqis reaffirmed in an interview in Tehran today that the majority of his men in the brigade had been killed near Shush and that the rest had been captured by the defending Iranian soldiers. Baghdad continues, however, to broadcast fake reports of imaginery triumphs in the battlefields as a desperate effort to bolster the ruining morale of its soldiers in the fronts and to appease angry citizens at home. [Text] [LD281500 Tehran IRNA in English 0931 GMT 28 Mar 82]

ANTI-U.S. DEMONSTRATION--Bonn, 27 Mar (IRNA)--An anti-U.S. demonstration was held today in West Berlin, organised by the Muslim students associations of Iran and Iraq. The demonstrators who carried pictures of Imam Khomeyni, martyr Ayatollah Sadr, Imam Musa Sadr shouted slogans in favour of the leader of the Iranian revolution and against the U.S., Saddam and Zionism. In conclusion of the demonstration a resolution was passed in which the massacre of people in South Lebanon, the intervention of the United States in the Persian Gulf region and Central America as well as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the prosecution of Muslims in Bahrain and Egypt were condemned. [Text] [LD281102 Tehran IRNA in English 0938 GMT 28 Mar 82]

MOJAHEDIN OPPOSITIONISTS EXECUTED--Tehran, 28 Mar (AFP)--Two leftwing Islamic Mojahedin oppositionists were executed last March 17 at Sari, north Iran, the newspaper ETTELA'AT reported today. According to the verdict by a local revolutionary court, the daily said, the two men had been in charge of arms procurement for the banned organization and had stolen from military arsenals 74 grenades, 17,100 rounds of G-3 rifle (?ammunition), 15,000 rounds of caliber-38 bullets, 226 tear gas grenades, 13 G-3 rifles, two (Israeli-made) UZI sub-machineguns and five Colts. Their arms cache was discovered six months ago by revolutionary guards, the report added. [Text] [NC282017 Paris AFP in English 2010 GMT 28 Mar 82]

ENVOY TO JAPAN--Tehran, 29 Mar (IRNA)--Mr Govahi, the newly-appointed Iranian ambassador to Japan, met and conferred this morning with Majlis speaker Rafsanjani. (?During the) meeting Iran-Japan relations were discussed. Also, Mr Mohammad Kiavashi was appointed to the post of charge d'affaires of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Austria by the Foreign Ministry. [Text] [LD030244 Tehran IRNA in English 1939 GMT 29 Mar 82 LD]

IRAQI AGGRESSION--During a meeting with the Iranian delegation participating in celebrations of the 12th anniversary of the British evacuation from Lybia, the Libyan secretary of justice announced the Iraqi aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian delegation is led by Majlis deputy Hasan Ruhani. [Text] [GF290440 Tehran International Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 28 Mar 82]

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ADDRESS--Compatriots, as we have already announced in previous programs the address of the National Resistance Movement of Iran has changed as of yesterday. The new address is as follows: Post Box 1006-16, 75761 Paris, Cedex, France. The address of Radio Iran has not changed. [Text] [GF221715 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 22 Mar 82]

PILOT ON KHOMEYNI--According to news agencies, an Iranian pilot named Kazem Khatam whose plane crashed near Kirkuk last night said in an interview: The morale of the armed forces has been severely weakened due to the executions without trial and detention of officers and sergeants without reason. He said: The air force has been disrupted by Khomeyni's regime and the ruling mullahs and no one feels secure in Iran, not even regime officials. This Iranian pilot mentioned the execution of 9- and 10-year-old girls and said: The continuance of executions has not had any effect except to increase dissent. [Text] [GF261613 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 25 Mar 82]

ISRAELI ARMS IMPORTS--Officials of the Islamic Republic are remaining silent on the documents regarding transactions on war materiel between Tehran and Israel. In our program yesterday we quoted the WASHINGTON POST, revealing details on the (?military) transactions between Tehran and Tel Aviv. A high-ranking Israeli official [words indistinct] the French LE MATIN newspaper and the U.S. NEW YORK TIMES confirmed the export of (?U.S.) arms to the Islamic Republic. The Iraqi Government has protested this to the U.S. administration and asked that Israel be ordered to stop exporting arms and military equipment to the Islamic Republic. In reply to Iraq's protests, the Reagan administration said that the war materiel bought by Israel and exported to the Islamic Republic is not subject to regulations banning re-export. Political circles describe the export of U.S. arms through Israel to the Islamic Republic as a flagrant violation of the alleged U.S. neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. [Text] [NC261616 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 26 Mar 82]

PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR--The new Pakistani ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Abdul Malik Khattak, presented his credentials to President 'Ali Khamene'i today. [Tehran International Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 20 Mar 82 GF]

KURDISH LEADER--Leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party 'Abdorrahman Qasemlu said in an interview yesterday: The people should not worry about the National Resistance Council's program because of Mas'ud Rajavi's strong religious beliefs or Bani-Sadr's cooperation with Khomeyni. Answering a question by a correspondent who asked whether the draft of the rule proposed by the National Resistance Council can be democratic, Qasemlu said that he prefers a (?bad) democracy to a (?good) dictatorship and added that [word indistinct] (?parties) should be free. [Text] [NC261546 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 26 Mar 82]

OPPOSITION LEADER--A Voice of Iran correspondent has reported from Paris that the former prime minister and leader of the National Salvation Front, Dr 'Ali Amini, has issued a statement in which he reveals that Khomeyni opposed the programs of land reforms and the granting of political and social freedoms to the women of the country. In his statement, Dr Amini said that a recording exists of talks with Khomeyni that took place when Amini was the prime minister, as well as other (?clear proofs) of Khomeyni's opposition. We add that Khomeyni was one of the big feudals of Arak and Khomeyn area who strongly opposed land reform. In his latest statement Dr 'Ali Amini refers to the demagogueries of the arbitrary regime and says that the Iranian people cannot be deceived today. Today the people can tell good from bad. The leader of the National Salvation Front once again called on all patriots and opponents of the despotic regime, irrespective of probable political and ideological differences, to prepare themselves in a strong unity to overthrow the ruling regime. [Text] [NC271251 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 26 Mar 82]

AMINI CHARGES--Dr 'Ali Amini, one of Iran's famous and well-known dignitaries and leaders of the Iranian Salvation Front, has announced that he has documents in hand which prove that Ruhollah Khomeyni rose to oppose and struggle against the shah because of the land reform programs and the granting of political and social rights to the women during the past regime. Dr Amini announced in a statement issued in Paris that before being exiled from Iran on orders of the shah and going first to Turkey and then to al-Najaf in Iraq, Khomeyni overtly opposed land reform and the granting of political and social rights to the Iranian women. Dr Amini said that during a meeting that he and the then prime minister had with Khomeyni in Qom (?before going into exile), Khomeyni spoke about his opposition to the shah because of the land reform and the granting of political rights to women and that he has a recording of these remarks. He also said that he will publish letters written by Khomeyni to the prime minister and the shah to clarify public opinion so that the people [words indistinct]. Dr Amini (?also said) [words indistinct] the people of Iran will be further acquainted with Khomeyni's reactionary views and will understand the main reason for Khomeyni's opposition with the shah. [Text] [NC271720 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 27 Mar 82]

PAHLAVI MEETS OPPOSITION--According to our correspondent's report from Paris, Reza Pahlavi, son of the late shah of Iran and leader of promonarchy groups who according to the constitution declared himself the shah of Iran in 1359 [21 March 1980-20 March 1981], attended a meeting in Versailles, near Paris, that was attended by military commanders, well-known political opponents of the present regime and his close advisers. Our correspondent, citing the weekly LE FIGARO, published in Paris, reports that Reza Pahlavi issued a statement at the end of this meeting in which he calls on the Iranian people to cooperate with the regime's opposition groups in order to overthrow the illegal government of Khomeyni. The full text of the Reza Pahlavi statement published in LE FIGARO will be carried during our international press review. [Text] [GF281805 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 28 Mar 82]

BAKHTIAR INTERVIEW--Dr Bakhtiar, the leader of the National Resistance Movement of Iran, in an interview with our correspondent in Paris today said that he has made no new contacts with opposition and political leaders opposing the Islamic Republic. Dr Bakhtiar also added that he continues to believe in social democratic ideals and will never change his political direction. He considers that any tendency to oppose the independence, freedom and national rule in Iran should be (?quelled). [Text] [GF291854 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 29 Mar 82]

CHARGE TO DENMARK--'Ali Naqi Sultani has been appointed charge d'affaires to the Islamic Republic of Iran's embassy in Denmark. Mr Sultan left for Denmark to assume his responsibilities. [GF281948 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 28 Mar 82 GF]

HAFTGEL MAYOR APPOINTED--Mr Bahram Nezamolmolki has been appointed mayor of Haftgel in an order issued by the governorate general's office of Khuzestan. [GF301830 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1330 GMT 30 Mar 82 GF]

CSO: 4640/221

HISTADRUT MAINTAINS GOOD RELATIONS IN AFRICA, ASIA

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 31 Jan 82 p 5

[Editorial: "The Political Front in Asia"]

[Text] Despite the pretentious pronouncements of the defense minister regarding cooperation with certain African countries, the dissemination of which has already caused damage to these ties and postponed the resumption of diplomatic relations, the activity of the Histadrut in the countries of the black continent and in Asia excels in its perseverance and unobtrusiveness. During the decade of the fifties it paved the way for expansion of the political ties of the sixties and after the great majority of African states severed diplomatic relations at the beginning of the seventies, it also preserved a presence in several important countries and assured continuation of the connection by means of the Afro-Asian Institute as well. The same thing took place in Asia, where the Histadrut maintains a widespread network of ties with the unions of liberal professions and in conferences with representatives of states with which Israel does not maintain diplomatic relations; emissaries of the Israeli labor movement participate in planning and operating agricultural and other cooperatives. As a young nation with a mixed economy and a strong public Histadrut sector, Israel serves as a source of inspiration for a significant number of developing countries.

In the course of these relations, Israel maintains an important position both in the International Union of Liberal Professions in Brussels (which at the beginning of the month gained considerable strength with the return of the American unions) as well as in the ARU, the Asian regional organization of the International. With the election of the chairman of the ARU, Singapore diplomat Devan Nair, to the position of president of his country, a reshuffling took place in this organization. The presidency passed to one of the heads of the Japanese Duma federations, with which the Histadrut has a cooperation agreement, while at the same time the pressure of the Indian unions was renewed with the encouragement of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for a return of the center of activities from Singapore to New Delhi, the official residence of the Asian regional organization.

Because of the traditional hostility of India toward Israel, this will tend to weigh heavily on the constructive activity of the Histadrut delegates on the continent. Beyond that, Israel lost a very enthusiastic supporter with

the departure of the Australian Robert Rauch from the presidency of the unions in his country; both in Australia and in New Zealand there is a sense of increasing erosion with respect to Israel even on the level of the labor movement.

All this demands our presence and intensive efforts in the activity of the Asian organization of the International. It is only to be hoped that the secretary general of the Histadrut, Yeruham Meshel, who serves as one of the vice presidents of the International and of ARU, will take advantage of his participation in the executive session of ARU in Tokyo to strengthen the ties with the Japanese unions as well as to assure the status of Israel in this vital Asian arena for the future, as well.

8090

CSO: 4423/111

HISTADRUT SETS NEW WAGES, LABOR RELATIONS POLICIES

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 Feb 82 pp 1,2

[Article by Yosef Golan, DAVAR labor relations correspondent: "Histadrut Adopts New Trades Policy"]

[Text] The coordinating committee of the trade unions branch headed by Yisrael Keysar yesterday decided on a new trades policy for the year commencing 1 April. The principal change in the policy is the demand that negotiations for wages be conducted on three levels--national, by branch and by industry, and that the process of introducing wage incentives in public services for the purpose of compensating workers for the lack of an additional level compared with the national level be accelerated.

Regarding the policy of the multi-year cost of living increase, it was stated in the resolution that the multi-year agreement should differ from the agreement about to expire at the end of March. It must be more quickly responsive to developments and it must be "an improved tool for assuring speedy and high compensation for the worker, matched with high rates of inflation, against the background of past experience."

The Histadrut will demand a complete updating of tax brackets with the goal of having the cost of living allowance compensate fully for the rise in the cost of living. The concept "100 percent cost of living increment" is not spelled out in the document; rather it speaks of "full cost of living allowance." There is a significance to the difference in terminology, if a gradual cost of living adjustment is to be decided on in conjunction with the rates of inflation.

The resolutions do not refer to the percentage of wage increase that the Histadrut will demand on the national level, but in the opinion of those who should know, if there is agreement on a full cost of living adjustment and anticipated inflation is about 100 percent, Histadrut will demand for next year 6 percent from April to October and another six percent from October to April 1983.

Thus far, employers have not agreed to include three levels in the kibbutz agreement and have even opposed reference to the branch and occupational levels. In the Histadrut policy it was indicated that the agreement would

be for but a single year, as it is not possible to forecast, beyond that, the rate of inflation and unemployment. But in the branch negotiations the condition of each branch will be taken into consideration. The principle does not vary; the wage increase will be in light of the increase in productivity, preservation of the real wage, the state of employment, and more.

It was further stated in the resolutions that the trade unions will conduct negotiations with the employer organizations on the matter of implementing the new wage scales, which are to be adjusted to the wage that is actually paid.

The DAVAR correspondent notes that even on that there has not been agreement on the part of the employers to date. As for public services, the Histadrut has put forth an important demand: inclusion of the identical increases that exist under various names for the basic wage of the scales of the various grades.

The trades policy stresses the theme of employment and prevention of unemployment, the promise of a minimum wage of 50 percent of the average wage and exclusion of cheap labor.

A special section deals with the matter of taxation, subsidies and legislation, on which the Histadrut must conduct negotiations. The Histadrut sees in these matters an inseparable element of the trades policy and wages.

8090

CSO: 4423/111

MIDDLE EASTERN JEWS RISE TO POWER IN LABOR PARTY; DISINTEGRATION FORESEEN

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 Feb 82 Weekend Supplement pp 32,33

[Article by Haim Handverker: "The Ethnic Horse"]

[Text] Rafi Tzabari, 35, from Rehovot, lives and breathes the Alignment--the Labor Party and the MAPAM--daily, almost hour by hour. He is a member of the workers council and very active within the political environment of the Alignment, in the lower echelons of the party. Rafi Tzabari, an immigrant from Yemen, knows, according to him, what others don't know--or refuse to recognize. In the Alignment, and in particular in the Labor Party, which has been depicted for the public as an Ashkenazi political party, there is a steady increase in the power of members from the Eastern communities and the day is not far off, by his reckoning, when in the Alignment there will take place severe shakeups that will totally alter the face of the party.

Some weeks before the elections to the Knesset, Rafi Tzabari was one of 200 members of the Judea District Council of the Labor Party, which chose its candidates for the Knesset. Four people found themselves candidates for the Knesset from the district: Amos Carmel, a native of Mekhon Weizmann, who publishes a great many articles in the press; Meir Gath, secretary general of the workers council at Rishon LeTzion, who was supported by the branch in his town, the largest of the district's branches; Mikhael Lapidot, chairman of the Alignment faction in the Rehovot Municipal Council. To these three, who are Ashkenazis, hold academic degrees, are articulate and present a pleasant appearance, was added Rafi Soysa, head of the local council of Mazkeret-Batya, a veteran party activist and a native of North Africa.

A short time before the vote, Mikhael Lapidot withdrew his candidacy after ascertaining that his prospects were not great. At the end of the voting, it turned out that Rafi Soysa garnered 110 votes; Meir Gath received something like 60 and Amos Carmel had to be satisfied with 12.

In the district council it was clear even before the start of the vote that Soysa would win despite the fact that the other candidates appeared more impressive. The reason for Soysa's victory is his "riding" on the ethnic "horse." Soysa created personal contact with all members of the district council (60 percent of them natives of Eastern communities), and among many of them the impression was created that compared with Soysa the North African,

the three Ashkenazis seemed to emerge as complacent. Among many members there arose an awareness that "we must show who is the strong one here." The struggle, which was supposed to be personal, became a singularly ethnic one.

The opponents of Soysa mocked him, saying that among the messages he was trying to transmit to the voters, his desire to invest efforts in the rehabilitation of prisoners and in the care of prisons in Israel stood out. There were some in the Judea District who questioned whether this was the message Soysa wanted to use to attain the Knesset. Was the population of the district (including many academicians) composed of criminals?...

Rafi Soysa wiped away the mockery with the well-worn adage: "He who laughs last, laughs best," and was elected to represent the district in the Knesset.

Ethnic and Political Awareness

Rafi Tzabari, the activist in the Alignment, says that the choice of Soysa--whom he, too, supported--articulates a reality in the Labor Party. As one descends from the top echelon of the party to its lower strata, it becomes evident that the number of members from the Eastern communities that is functioning in the districts and in the branches is larger than that of the Ashkenazis. This is in stark contrast with the image of the Labor Party among the public. Although 60 percent of the voters of the Labor Party are Ashkenazis, people from the Eastern communities are conspicuous at its base. These members have a very keen ethnic awareness and will choose someone with a social and mental affinity for the various tasks in the framework of the branches and the districts, and for representation functions. Thus, the election of Soysa for membership in the Knesset is not unique.

It would seem that these things reflect reality. Data presented by authoritative sources in the Labor Party indicate that the strength of the Eastern ethnics is great in the territorial districts (excluding the districts of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, the kibbutzim and the moshavin), and their number even exceeds 65 percent of the total party membership. A survey of various districts of the party indicates that in the Negev 75 percent of the members are Eastern ethnics; in the Southern District (Ashdod-Netivot) 85 percent of the members are Eastern ethnics; in Judea (from Rishon-Letzion to Mazkeret-Batya) 60 percent are of Eastern origin, in Ramat Gan 60 percent; in Samaria (from Netanya to Atlit) 70 percent; in the lower Galilee District (Acre, Nahariya, Carmiel, Shlomi) 70 percent and in the Galilee District 70 percent.

Exceptions to this are the southern Dan District (Hulon, Bat-Yam, Azor), where the distribution by communities is fifty-fifty; the northern Dan District, with a majority of Ashkenazis (60 percent), and the Sharon District, with a majority of 70 percent Ashkenazis.

Shmaya Ziv of the organizational division of the Labor Party says that the gathering strength of the Eastern ethnics in the branches and in the districts is a relatively new phenomenon of the past 10 years. The party people in the area, in each settlement, were based on a nucleus of East European immigrants, even in a settlement containing a majority of Eastern Mediterranean ethnics.

This stemmed from the fact that Jews from the Islamic countries possessed no political awareness. "My father was not interested in politics. I am interested." The reason for the turnabout is rooted in the fact that a new generation has arisen of people with political perception and class consciousness. These people from the Eastern ethnic communities are highly motivated to achieve the party peak, for we are living in an acquisitional society and politics is a good tool for acquiring things.

The result is that in the territorial districts of the party, mainly Eastern community ethnics were chosen as candidates for the Knesset, but the arrangements committee, realistically, did not include all of them. In the Negev District, Uri Savag was chosen; in the Southern District, Ya'akov Sa'adon; in the Judea District, Rafi Soysa; in Ramat Gan, Uri 'Amit; in Samaria District, Yizhak Haziata; and in the Galilee, Aharon Nahamias was entered through the central list. The only Ashkenazis on this list are Amos 'Aran of Sharon District, 'Adi Amora'i from Northern Dan and Pinhas Ayalon, who was chosen "for the honor" in Hulon and Bat-Yam.

In interviews not for quoting and not for attribution with Ashkenazi members of the Labor Party, it turns out that there is prevalent among them the feeling that the prospects of a member of Ashkenazi origin (and "worst of all, of Polish origin") striving to reach the top echelon through the branches and the districts is barred as a result of the increasing strength of the Eastern ethnics and the ethnic balance, if a low-level politician chooses to advance himself. Those sources explain the need to preserve their anonymity by arguing that if they criticize the phenomenon publicly they might appear to the public as hostile to the Eastern communities, and their political prospects would be damaged.

We found confirmation of this argument in interviews with members of Eastern origin in the Labor Party. For example, Moshe Levi, a member of the Labor Party who holds portfolio of ports in the Histadrut and also serves as a member of the party central, says that for a person of Ashkenazi origin it is difficult to integrate with the party activity in the branches and in the districts and to be elected to a key post because among many of the Eastern community people who dominate the branches there has been a feeling of discrimination for many years. It doesn't matter whether this is justified or not. This creates an obligation for many people to support the candidate from their community, who also possess a common language with the members, and it does not matter who is best suited for the job.

Moshe Levi believes that this situation is unhealthy. He urges young, capable, intellectual people to turn away from the branches of the party. They conclude that the requirements for success at this level of the party are petty intrigues and trivial struggles, in which they are unwilling to participate.

The Establishment Vs. the Men on the Line

In the Labor Party building in Tel Aviv the growth of the power of Eastern communities people in the party and among the Israeli public in general is

felt. According to senior sources in the party, the change of power within the Labor Party elevates it to pragmatic lines that are far from the party platform. They say in the Labor Party that it is no secret that the hawkish line is dominant among persons of the Eastern communities, even if they are members of the Labor Party. With a touch of cynicism, there are those who say that the party leadership senses that it is obligated to respond to the demands of this wide circle of members and therefore the day is not far off when the leaders of the party will be required to end every sentence with "the Lord willing" or "praise the Lord."

Following the recent elections, a senior forum gathered in the Labor Party and concluded that if the party leadership wants the support of the ranks and even to expand its electoral strength, it must implement a more hawkish and religious image in its various articulations. Thus, moderate powers such as Yossi Sarid and Abba Eban are apt to be shunted aside in the mobile propaganda line of the party.

In the Labor Party today, many members of the branches and the districts feel heavy pressure--particularly from the Eastern ethnics--to seize senior party positions. It is difficult for the leadership of the party to withstand all these demands when it is known to all that the top echelon of the party is top-heavy with Ashkenazis whereas the base is Eastern. Thus, there is no alternative except a process of democratization in the party.

For public consumption, the leaders of the Labor Party--including Shimon Peres and Haim Bar Lev--proclaim that they will take action to provide many opportunities for people to make their way up through the ranks, and the intention is mainly for the Eastern ethnics. However, in the Labor Party this process is feared as fire is feared, as it is apt to accelerate the replacement of the top echelon of the party with people who have accumulated political power in the field and who lack the capabilities of running a state and a party.

Mr Mordekhai Gani, one of the leaders of the trade unions in the Histadrut, says that the Labor Party, like other parties, has developed procedures to prevent people in the ranks from reaching the top echelon such as the Arrangements Committee, which determines who will receive actual positions in the Knesset. Were secret and personal elections for central positions to be held in the party, the leadership would change its position. The people to rise would be those who have "troops" behind them, such as the district leaders in the party and the heads of the trade unions. Many of today's leaders would find themselves cast aside.

Not long ago, many members of the top echelon in the party, such as Teddy Kolleck, could feel that personal prestige is not necessarily a guarantee of tenure in the important forums of the party. Within the framework of the steps to democratize the party it had been established in the convention that the party cabinet, which is the top institution of the party and in effect dictates policy to its faction in the Knesset, is to be composed 50 percent of persons from the districts and 50 percent of persons from the upper echelon of the party. Thus, many "ethnic" people gained entry to one of the important councils, and veteran members were pushed out of the cabinet.

Under the pressure of events, the struggle between Haim Bar Lev and Eliahu Shpeiser over the general secretaryship of the party is forgotten. In the Labor Party it is well known that one of the sources of the struggle between the two is the attempt of people from the districts and people from among the ethnics to get to the top echelon with the moving factor being Shpeiser. Bar Lev represented the establishment and the upper echelon of the Labor Party. Despite Shpeiser's failure, they do not forget in the Labor Party that he received one-third of the vote, a not-to-be-disregarded quantity considering that the entire leadership stood as a unified front against him.

Following the failure of the Yahdav faction to bring Shpeiser to the position of secretary general of Labor, members of the top level of the faction decided to establish a new faction on the remnants of the one that had disintegrated; the Faction for Rejuvenation of the Labor Party. This faction demands, among other things, secret ballots in the party organizations for Knesset candidates. It would appear that this faction will constitute a drawing power for many activists of the branches of the party and the districts, especially for members of the Eastern ethnic communities.

Seats Replace Ideology

Moshe Levi believes that the Labor Party for many years held to a system of harnessing ethnic "planets" to its list in order to placate members of the ethnic communities. "Despite my Eastern origins, I am opposed to a quota of 30 percent for ethnic people in the party organizations. It's not natural. I don't want someone to get a job thanks to his ethnic origin. All members should be afforded equality of opportunity in being elected, and then the capable and genuine leadership of the ethnic members will emerge, those people who are frustrated today because they have not attained their proper position."

Despite the talk of democratization in the party, Moshe Levi anticipates that many struggles will be carried on before the activists from the lower strata succeed in reaching the top, "but we are moving in the right direction."

In the Labor Party, it is feared that even the Histadrut is apt to become a focus of tension against the background of ethnicity. The labor councils, which were based on immigrants from Eastern Europe, include today, in particular, people from the Eastern ethnic communities. In more than 60 percent of the labor councils, there are today council secretaries of ethnic origin. People of the labor councils have always been considered the strength and the "troops" of the Labor Party. Now there is bitterness among the people of the labor councils because they are not being integrated into jobs in the worker economy. "It is not possible that the administration of the worker economy should be purely Ashkenazi, while the trade unions and the labor councils are purely Mideastern ethnic," the worker delegates say.

Rafi Tzabari believes that there is no ideology at all behind the formation of the power focus in the base of the Labor Party. This is a formation of power for the sake of power, where the goal is the grasp for seats and various honors. The ethnic is not the essence of this activity, merely a pawn in the

struggle. "You may not believe it, but in the senior positions on the local level of the party there are people who are rich contractors or money lenders. Would it be possible that in a social democratic party people like this could find a place? Those people know nothing at all about socialism, but they know what political power is and how to exploit it."

A person in the upper echelon of the Labor Party told us that the formation of power in the party's base is nothing more than the result of a leadership and ideological crisis that began in the party years ago. As long as there are mutual ideological goals, it is possible to unify around them. The breakoff of RAFI from MAPAI, against the background of Ben Gurion's boys trying to get to the top at any price, while the old-time top leadership prevailed, is the signal for the start of ideological degeneration in the party. The idea is the least important. When the top echelon in the party came apart following the Yom Kippur War, the party was left without leadership. Even the struggle between Rabin and Peres over party leadership was not ideological but personal.

When there is this kind of atmosphere in the party, it is no wonder that even the activists in the rear ranks seek to reach the top even though they do not always have anything to say on matters intellectual.

This opinion is similar to that of Rafi Tzabari. The leadership and ideological crisis in the party will change its image and its character. He foresees the Labor Party breaking up. In a few years members who are more idealistic will conclude that there is no point in continuing in a partnership with the other party, which is pragmatic and which will be the moving force in the party. MAPAM and the group that is more leftist in the Labor Party will see no point in remaining in such a party and will therefore separate from it.

4423/111

CSO: 8090

SHARON DISCUSSES IDF 1981 EDUCATION BUDGET

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 30 Dec 81 p 5

[Article by Yannon Shenkar: "IDF 1981 Education Budget--130 Million Shekels"]

[Text] Defense Minister Ariel Sharon revealed the following information in the Knesset this week when responding to some agenda proposals on the issues of educational activity and guaranteed elementary-level education to IDF soldiers that were presented by Ya'akov Tzur (Alignment) and Yehuda Perah (Likud): about 7.5 percent of all IDF soldiers (men serving their army duty) have 7-year education and another 7.5 percent have an 8-year education. The total direct budget for educational activity in the IDF for fiscal 1981 is 130 million shekels, out of which 40 percent comes from the Libbi Fund.

Minister Sharon noted that the educational activity touches the entire IDF, and its purpose is to "strengthen the motivation to serve the army and the state in general by increasing identification with the nation of Israel, the land of Israel and the IDF itself."

Talking about the different educational activities that are taking place this year, the minister noted the following: education and enrichment to about 9,000 boys and girls who come from low socioeconomic circumstances, leadership and human relations training for about 15,000 in commander courses on all levels, education and propaganda series to 50,000 soldiers, trips to get to know the country to about 4,000 soldiers, about 1,000 study days in units themselves, the absorption in the army of about 1,000 alienated youth, educational and cultural services for the whole army and the preparation of youth for their army service.

Ariel Sharon said: "The activity today, especially with regard to low socioeconomic populations, does not meet all needs both in terms of in-depth treatment and the number of those in need in relationship to the overall size of the population. Today, the IDF gives educational support only to those who have an education of 7 years or less." And he added: "Among those who study are boys and girls from populations that had previously been categorized as below draft level. Their educational, professional and social advancement in the IDF can ensure their participation in the society and to a great extent, in the future of the next generation."

MK Ya'akov Tzur said in the discussion that we have to ensure that all soldiers with no education will get the appropriate courses, both at the beginning of their military service and at the end of it, as preparation for civilian life. Added MK Tzur: "The direction that the IDF took in the last 2 years, at the blessed initiative of the chief of staff, not only strengthens the IDF but should serve as an incentive to the Ministry of Education and to other civilian bodies to see the issue in a new light and to develop cooperative tools for the success of the educational enterprise."

Said MK Yehuda Perah: "The fact that after a month in the military system the soldier walks differently, straight and proud, says that we have to continue building that system, to see it as our most cherished possession, and not think for a minute that this is a waste of money."

On the recommendation of the defense minister, and with the agreement of the two Knesset members, the matter was transferred to a joint committee of the education and foreign affairs committees, for a more thorough examination.

9433

CS0: 4423/110

EXPORTS, INDUSTRIAL USE TAKING GREATER SHARE OF FOOD OUTPUT

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Jan 82 p 12

[Article by Avraham Tzahar: "Agricultural Produce in a Move From the Local Market to Export and Industry"]

[Text] The Israeli economy is apparently in the middle of a shift in the destinations of agricultural produce. According to the manager of the food division in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Mr Beni Toren, there is no doubt that industry takes a larger part of the fresh agricultural produce every year. At the same time, despite the natural increase in the population and the increase in the standard of living, there is a continuous decrease in the quantity of agricultural produce going to the local market.

Destination of Agricultural Produce (in percentage)

	1970-1	1975-6	1980-1
Local market	37	36	27
Industrial use	25	27	33
Direct export	26	25	30
Reused in agriculture	10	12	12

Ten years ago, 37 percent of the agricultural produce was sold in the country for local consumption; last year we consumed only 27 percent. On the other hand, the value of the produce that went for industrial processing rose from 25 to 33 percent. A simultaneous rise was registered in the size of direct agricultural exports--from 26 to 30 percent of the total produce value.

The main factor in these changes is that the consumption of fresh food in Israel is in a state of saturation. That means that all additional produce has to be processed by industry into a more sophisticated product or has to be exported to countries that suffer from shortages (even seasonal ones) in fresh produce. As a result of another factor, rapid industrialization, the rate of the absorption of produce by industry is faster than the rate of the increase in exports.

But exports are not hurt by that, says Mr Haim Yishai, from the food division in the Ministry of Industry; according to up-to-date reports, the value of

Israeli food industry exports reached 35 billion shekels in 1981. This sum, at the present exchange rate, equals \$3 billion. In the same year, food industry exports totaled \$345 million. In other words, 11 percent of the products of this industry, which processes agricultural products and competes with direct agricultural exports, goes to export which in itself has a very high added value. In 1980, exports totaled only 9 percent of the total value of production in the food industry.

9433

CSO: 4423/110

BRIEFS

ARAB SUPREME COURT CANDIDATE--For the first time since the state of Israel was created, an Arab will probably be appointed as a Supreme Court Justice in Jerusalem. Such a suggestion was already presented to the committee that appoints justices and will probably be approved by next Wednesday, the 17th. The idea of appointing an Arab to the Supreme Court was first presented in 1976 by Prime Minister Begin, who was then a member of the Knesset. His suggestion was not accepted, and the appointment was postponed indefinitely. In December 1977, a few months after Shmuel Shamir was appointed minister of justice, the name of an Arab supreme court candidate came up again, that of Muhammad Nimer Al-Hawari of Nazareth. Since then, the subject has not been mentioned again. A few weeks ago, the committee that appoints justices received new suggestions for the appointment of the first Arab Supreme Court Justice. This time the suggestions got a lot of support, mainly because of the argument that the size of the Arab population in Israel justifies their having a representative in the highest judicial authority. Among the names that were brought up were those of some well-known Arab jurists, among them a member of a well-known Arab family from Nazareth. The Supreme Court needs two new members. Two people have already been recommended, Solicitor General Gavriel Bach and District Judge Dov Levin. In 2 months, Judge Landau, the president of the Supreme Court, will retire. Thus, a special situation arises in which, of 12 members in the highest judicial authority, 5 will be new members. [Text] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 10 Feb 82 p 7] 9433

DRUZE DRAFT EXEMPTIONS--The decrease in the importance of religion among the young people of the Druze sect is reflected in the smaller number of members of the sect who seek draft exemptions for religious reasons. It is reported that in 1978, 46 Druze youth were granted draft exemptions for religious reasons, whereas in 1982 their number dropped to only 18. Another reason for the decrease in the number of those who seek draft exemptions for religious reasons lies in the stricter handling of these cases by the spiritual authority. The head of the Druze section in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Dr Nissim Dana, makes recommendations for draft exemptions to the Defense Ministry. Every Druze who seeks draft exemption for religious reasons has to take a test administered by the heads of the spiritual authority in the village of Julis, and only then does the recommendation go to the head of the Druze section in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, who after an interview with the person seeking exemption passes it to the Defense Ministry. [Text] [Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 9 Feb 82 p 4] 9433

CSO: 4423/110

KUWAIT

PRESS COMMENTS ON WEST BANK DISTURBANCES

LD231238 Kuwait KUNA in English 1109 GMT 23 Mar 82

[From the press review]

[Text] Kuwait, 23 Mar (KUNA)--Kuwaiti newspapers were Tuesday unanimous in commenting on the Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

AR-RAY AL-'AMM wrote: "Israel yesterday gave an example of its insolence in a disgusting manner when the official spokesman voiced solidarity with the Afghan people in their struggle against foreign invasion and oppression and hoped to see them attain independence and full civil rights in a democratic atmosphere very soon.

"Let us visualise how insolent Israel can be. Israel is against foreign invasion whereas its forces are occupying Palestine and it is against oppression at the time when its troops are killing Palestinians all over Palestine.

"In fact, both Israel and America would have preferred to be [in] Afghanistan instead of the Soviet Union which sent its rapid deployment force there first.

"When we remember that Israel itself was the legitimate nation of an immoral dilemma, we discover that we have been applying our own morals on Israel since it occupied Palestine forgetting an important fact that Israel 'resolved' its problem with the support of the West whereas we went about seeking sympathy and justice from others.

"And here, we are faced with a bitter fact too, that we have our own insolence. Is there a more fitting word for the present de facto situation of the Arabs other than insolence. Is there any better description for our present division, inter-fighting and submission other than insolence.

"Is there another description for our present shameful surrender to America and Israel. We do not think so at all."

AL-WATAN said: "The West Bank rose to reject the Camp David agreements and say that the agreements have gone to the grave with the man who signed them and will take with them all those who wish to see Palestine colonised. The Palestinian people have been rebelling against aggression and oppression ever since the British planned the occupation of Palestine in the twenties.

"The forcefully silent (Arab) nation is unable to support the revolutionaries of the West Bank because it is doomed to hear and obey but not to shut out or demonstrate. The important nation, from the ocean to the Gulf, is deprived of performing its duty because most regimes fear demonstrators even if they were its own men screaming out in support. This nation is unable to respond because the regimes fear the enemies within more so than they do the enemy on the borders.

"Our people who believe in Palestine and its revolution and the great people in the occupied territories are asking to be taught how heroism can be, how manhood is born, how sacrifice is made and how the land is more precious than the soul and dearer than gold and jewels.

"Teach us that death in defense of the home is life and that life is but a moment of pride. Teach us how to liberate Palestine so that we can be liberated and attain the great victory of liberating both the land and the man.

AL-QABAS wrote: "Israel's Prime Minister Begin is angry and is expressing his anger by bombing cities and camps, annexing occupied territories, breaking the bones of the civilians in the West Bank and threatening to occupy Sinai in 24 hours (if Egypt violated the peace agreement).

"But we have not seen an example of such anger in the Arab world except perhaps the 'stones revolution' in the West Bank. Nobody else in the Arab world showed anger, possibly because those who became angry did so secretly or possibly because anger has died a long time ago in the hearts of the Arabs.

"Begin is racing with time to create 'the grand Israel' before the Arabs awaken and get angry, before Egypt tears up Camp David agreements, before the Gulf Cooperation Council completes progress towards unity, before the dictatorial regimes in the Arab world collapse, before the Iraqi-Iranian war is over, before the Western Sahara dispute is settled, before the Lebanese discover that they are being cheated by the Zionists and before the Palestinian revolution triumphs.

"Israel is trampling in the Middle East in the name of the United States because of a destructive historical error that brought Reagan to power in the White House at the time Begin was ruling Israel.

"Flamboyant Reagan who lacks ideology, a line of policy or a civil outlook is unaware that the interests of three quarters of the peoples of the world are tied, one way or the other, with the depth of his thinking.

"But Reagan chose the easy way out and divided the world into black and white with America and its allies on the white sheet and Russia and allies on the black one.

"The stones revolution continues and Begin's race with time goes on before the Arabs awaken. Meantime, Reagan remains the black spot in the history of the White House and that of the contemporary Arabs as well."

CSO: 4400/188

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

GCC AID--AL-ANBA' has learned from informed Gulf sources that, during their recent meeting in Riyadh, the GCC chiefs of staff reviewed a detailed plan to defend Bahrain's security through the development of its defense forces and providing them with the necessary weapons in view of the threats that this fraternal state may face in the future. The sources added that the next step involves the implementation of a similar plan to defend the Sultanate of Oman and recompense its need for the support of any foreign forces once the plan of its armament and the elevation of the defense capability of its forces are completed. This comes within the framework of the integrated plan to protect the Gulf. This plan has been given the dedication of all available resources in the region's states, including the necessary coordination to fill the gaps in their defense. The Gulf sources informed AL-ANBA' that, with regard to the U.S.-Omani agreement on facilities, the Sultanate can abrogate this agreement once it has completed the construction of its intrinsic defense capabilities which complement the joint Gulf forces. The sources added that such matters are not considered obstacles for the GCC and that a general understanding on this issue exists. [Excerpts] [GF191425 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 18 Mar 82 p 1]

OSO: 4400/188

JUNBLATT ON AL-JUMAYYIL, SECURITY, ELECTIONS

NC250946 Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 22-28 Mar 82 pp 18-25

[Interview with Walid Junblatt, head of the National Movement, by Lydia Georgi, date and place not given]

[Text] The leader of the leftist National Movement, Walid Junblatt, has issued three warnings to Bashir al-Jumayyil, leader of the rightist "Lebanese Forces" militia.

In a private interview with MONDAY MORNING last week, Junblatt said:

--If Bashir al-Jumayyil continues his attempt to impose his conditions on the Moslems of Lebanon regarding the presidential elections, the Moslems of Lebanon would respond with their own conditions--including a demand for an end to the Maronite presidency and the initiation of "majority rule."

--If Bashir al-Jumayyil refuses to sever his relations with Israel and continues to count on an Israeli attack to "reinforce his political power," the National Movement would find its own Arab or international ally "and we will become that ally's puppet as they are the puppet of Israel." He added that "the world is full of countries ready to help us."

--If Bashir al-Jumayyil carries his "blackmail" threats of partition any further, the Moslems of Lebanon would accept the challenge and partition. "If they don't want to live with us, or if they want to live with us only on their own terms, we are ready to partition," he said.

Junblatt issued the warnings in response to an enigmatic statement made last week by Bashir al-Jumayyil, who called on the Moslems of Lebanon to join him in "confronting" unspecified developments which he said would shake the region. If they did not, he warned, he would have to take "the decision" on his own, although the Moslems would be welcome to share the fruit of his actions later.

Junblatt charged that al-Jumayyil was trying to force the Moslems to cooperate with him in a plan to drive the Syrians and Palestinians out of Lebanon so that he could later "subdue" the Moslems and impose his conditions on them.

His immediate objective, he said, was to block the presidential elections by forcing some Christian MPs to boycott them, which would face the Moslems with a choice between a "constitutional vacuum" and possible partition or acceptance of an extension of President Ilyas Sarkis' mandate, which expires on September 23 this year.

He wanted an extension of Sarkis' mandate, he said, because he wanted more time to make himself acceptable to the Moslems before a new president was elected, and he believed that two more years of the Sarkis regime would be enough time.

Junblatt said that the United States appeared to favor a "normal transition" of presidential power, and it had the power to pressure Bashir al-Jumayyil into dropping his plans to block the presidential elections.

But whatever happened, he added, Bashir would never succeed in imposing himself as the sole representative of the Lebanese Christians and the only man the Moslems could talk to.

The leftist leader said he was ready at any time to hold talks with the Phalangist Party (including Beshir's father Pierre al-Jumayyil and his brother Amin) and with the Lebanese Front (including former President Camille Sham'un). Bashir, as "the leader of a military faction," could meet with the military leaders of the National Movement, he said.

But he asked: "Where are the so-called Lebanese Front and the Phalange Party...? Bashir is the one who decides everything. He has decided to renounce the Phalange Party, his father, his brother and everyone else. So how can we deal...? He wants to be the only one, and we cannot accept that. As long as that condition is there, there will be no contact, no political dialogue, no national entente."

The next president: Junblatt said he still supported the self-exiled Lebanese leader Raymond Iddih as a candidate for the presidency, despite Iddih's recent announcement that he would not run unless the Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF) withdrew from Lebanon and were replaced by an Arab-European force and unless the UN interim force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed in all parts of the south down to the Lebanese-Israeli borders.

Junblatt said he approved the UNIFIL-deployment condition but could not accept the ADF-withdrawal condition. He believed, however, that Iddih could be persuaded to change his mind on this point.

Whether Iddih or someone else was elected, he said, the next president of Lebanon "will be a compromise among the Lebanese, the Arabs and certain other powers."

Junblatt discounted reports that the elections, which must be held between July and September, according to the constitution, would be preceded by another round of fighting. "Maybe some of the old hot lines which have now cooled down, like the Souks, will be heated up again...but I don't expect more than that," he said.

Embassy terrorism: Junblatt rejected recent charges by National Movement and Palestinian leaders that Israel, Lebanese Army Intelligence (Deuxieme Bureau) and the Phalangist Party were behind the wave of terrorist bombs in West Beirut.

"I don't blame those parties," he said, but he added he expected the terrorism to go on because "certain powers have decided that they can change the policies of other powers by bombing their embassies."

He said he expected an increasing number of embassies to follow in the footsteps of Iraq and move their premises from West Beirut to al-Hazimiyah in East Beirut. "Rents are going to be quite high in al-Hazimiyah in the future," he remarked.

West Beirut security: "The general situation in Lebanon's predominantly Moslem areas was bad" and the Moslems in general are weak," Junblatt said. "But that is not because (Bashir al-Jumayyil) is powerful; it is because the allies of the Moslems are stupid...and if they go on behaving like this, they will do great damage to their cause and ours."

The National Movement's much trumpeted security plan failed two months ago "for reasons which are not for publication now," he said, and now it was up to the Internal Security Forces, the ADF and the Palestinians to come up with "a solid, valid plan for the protection of foreigners and embassies and general security in West Beirut."

As for the dormant decisions of the Lebanese Palestinian-Syrian "higher coordination committee" to close all party offices in the cities and collect all militia arms, the committee was scheduled to meet in Damascus this week to follow them up, "and I hope this time we will finally achieve something."

The following is the full text of the interview, which was conducted in English:

What do you read into Bashir al-Jumayyil statements last week, in which he called on the Moslems to join the Christians in confronting future developments lest he be forced to take the necessary "decision" by himself?

To begin with, we are ready to collaborate with the Christians at any time, but not with Bashir al-Jumayyil. He does not represent the Christians. He represents part of the Christians, and only because he is imposing himself on them by armed pressure.

As for the "decision" he is talking about, I assume he is going to try to block the presidential elections by forcing some of the Christian MPs not to attend the voting session. I believe his main objective nowadays is to block the presidential elections, so as to prolong the regime of Sarkis.

What interest would he have in extending....

Bashir al-Jumayyil wants to gain some credibility and to be accepted here in this area--to be recognized by the Moslems. That is difficult to do now, but he probably feels that it will become possible in two years. That is why he would want an extension.

Bashir al-Jumayyil is deciding on his own now. Where are the so-called Lebanese Front and the Phalange Party? We are no longer hearing anything from them. He is the one who is deciding everything, apparently, which is quite abnormal.

So you think that the decision he is talking about has something to do with blocking the presidential elections?

I think so. And I also believe he is expecting some action from his friends--our neighbors, the Israelis--before the elections and before the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. He is expecting some action against the Palestinians and the Syrians that he hopes will create a political and military shock and enable him to reinforce his political power.

You say, and you have always said, that he is not the representative of the Christians. But since he is one of the representatives of the Christians, are you ready to meet him along with the other representatives?

What he represents is an armed, military faction. Fine. I also have military leaders here on this side, and I think they can meet with him--no problems there. Let the military men meet and discuss military options. As for me, I am ready to meet with the others--his brother, his father, Sham'un, the Maronite order.... I am speaking about the Maronites on the other side, but there are others: Jean 'Aziz, Fu'ad Tihini, Sulayman Franjiyah and Raymond Iddih....

So you are ready to meet with Amin al-Jumayyil, for instance, without preconditions?

No, it would be stupid to meet Amin al-Jumayyil without conditions. We--the parties involved on the Lebanese political scene--will have to meet some day to discuss the future of Lebanon. On this side, we have three or four different groups; on the other side, we can also easily find three or four different groups.

But now, Bashir al-Jumayyil is the one who decides everything. He has decided to renounce the Phalange Party, his father, his brother and everyone else. So how can we deal?

In his latest statement, Bashir al-Jumayyil also adopted the assessment of Information Minister Michel Iddih: That the present situation is similar to the situation which prevailed in 1948, prior to the creation of the state of Israel. Do you understand this to mean that he is predicting the partition of Lebanon and the creation of a Christian state?

Lebanon is already partitioned in a way. We have a Bashir mini-state over there and another mini-state in the south, not to mention the other mini-states in Lebanon.

Of course, he is dreaming of creating a Christian state, but that is a very dangerous dream that would sabotage the existence of the Christians in the Middle East, isolating them from the Moslems, from the Arab world. Our political, economic and cultural interests are linked with the Arab world. A small state in the rocky mountain there, in Jubayl or Kasrawan, would not serve the interests of the Christians.

Is he comparing himself with the Zionist colonization in 1947-48? That's a far-fetched comparison. I believe they were much more intelligent than he is.

Do you still support Raymond Iddih for president after his recent announcement of three preconditions to nomination: ADF withdrawal, deployment of Arab-European forces and full deployment of UNIFIL in the south?

I accept the last condition: full deployment of UNIFIL in the south. As for the other conditions, we will discuss them with Raymond Iddih when he becomes president. Yes, I am still supporting him as a candidate.

I think he can be persuaded to change the ADF condition, which is not very realistic. He is asking for ADF withdrawal, and I say that is not possible, but at the same time, my support of him is a position of principle. I think he is an honest and courageous man.

Do you think he has any chance of being elected in the present circumstances?

Nobody knows. In this country, you can expect anything.

Do you think the danger of our de facto partition turning into real partition is growing as we approach the presidential elections? Do you share the fears of a constitutional vacuum at the presidential level that might lead to the final partition of Lebanon?

No. I think it is Bahir's policy to threaten us with a constitutional vacuum, so that we will either accept some of his conditions or accept the extension of Sarkis' mandate. That, I believe, is his plan, but I don't think he will push things to the point of declaring a Christian state. That would not be realistic.

So you think the Lebanese will agree on a compromise president?

Any president who comes to power will be a compromise among the Lebanese, the Arabs and certain other powers. Even the election of Raymond Iddih, if it were to happen, would be a result of this compromise.

And you think the Lebanese people will be able to achieve this minimum level of consensus to agree on a president?

The Lebanese people are not going to decide who the new president will be. Parliament decides, not the people, and there is a big difference between parliament and the people. Poor Lebanese people: They decide nothing.

The compromise will be achieved through the present so-called parliament and the leaders. There's no other way.

So you're not afraid that the inability of the Lebanese to elect a president might precipitate partition?

Let me ask you a question: What if there was partition? So what?

The other side is always threatening that they will partition Lebanon if we don't accept their conditions. Our answer to them is that we reject their conditions and that we have our own conditions. If they want to partition, let them go ahead; we will partition too. We know what the international and Arab repercussions will be, and we know that the situation on this side is terrible, chaotic, frightening, but nevertheless, we are ready to partition if that is what they want. If they don't want to live with us, or if they want to live with us only on their own terms, we are ready to partition.

You say you have your own conditions. What are they?

We cannot accept the other sides' constant blackmail tactics. If they insist on their conditions, we will insist on our conditions. We want radical political reform, real (Christian-Moslem) participation (in government). We don't want a Maronite president anymore. Maybe we would accept a Christian president, but why always a Maronite? In fact, we want majority rule: The Shi'ites are the largest community, so let the president be Shi'ite. That is one condition we can place if the other side continues its threats.

If they want to push things to an extreme, we will partition, we will partition.

In other words, if they continue to say they have conditions regarding the presidency, you plan to say that you have conditions too, and that one of those conditions will be a non-Maronite president. Is that right?

Right.

What are you asking them to do to keep you from adopting that attitude?

I'm not asking them for anything at all. Because of our chaotic situation on this side these days, our position is weaker than theirs. All right. We ask them to renounce their relationship with Israel. They don't want to? Okay, let them continue that relationship, and we will find our own reliable ally, Arab or international, and we will become that ally's puppet as they are the puppet of Israel. We will see what happens then.

You don't have an ally now?

Some allies, but not strategic allies. We have a strong ally in Syria, but later, we may push further.

With Syria or with someone else?

We'll see later.

There is much talk about a new round of fighting before the presidential elections. Do you think the prediction is well-founded?

We're not the ones who are talking about this--they are. They're preparing themselves, expecting the Israelis to attack. It is all part of the game to block the presidential elections and prolong the mandate of Sarkis.

I sincerely hope that further fighting will be avoided. A new round of fighting would not serve the interests of anyone, and I don't think it will come to that. Maybe some of the old hot lines which have now cooled down, like the souks, will be heated up again. Maybe. But I don't expect more than that.

Can you tell us if there are contacts of any kind, direct or indirect, between the Lebanese Front and the National Movement?

Personally, I have no contacts with the Phalange Party. With the Lebanese Front? Maybe through the Maronite order; sometimes I exchange views with Abbot Nu'man and Father Qazzi, but that's all. As for the other parties in the National Movement, I don't think there are any contacts, but I don't know.

Do Abbot Nu'man and Father Qazzi act as go-betweens?

No, they don't. We just have occasional chats about the political situation in general.

Are you satisfied with the way things are in the National Movement now?

It's all right for the time being.

As leader of the National Movement, what are you ready to do to break out of the vicious circle we have been in for seven years? I mean, if the Lebanese leaders don't meet now to save their country, when will they meet? Just now, you said you would meet Amin al-Jumayyil?

...among others.

...among others. But why are there always conditions?

I'm not the one who is putting conditions, am I? It is Bashir al-Jumayyil who is putting conditions and who wants to be the only leader on that side. He is one among several, but he wants to be the only one, and we cannot accept that. As long as that condition is there, there will be no contact, no political dialogue, no national entente.

You are saying, in other words, that the main obstacle blocking a dialogue is Bashir al-Jumayyil's insistence that he is the only leader who can talk in the name of the Christians or the Maronites?

He thinks he represents the Maronites and the Christians, which is not true. And suppose we want to talk to the other side, who are we to talk to? Where in the Lebanese Front? Where is the Phalange Party? What has happened to them? Have they been swallowed up?

I know the situation in this area (west Beirut) is bad and the Moslems in general are weak. But that is not because he is powerful, it is because the allies of the Moslems are stupid. They are stupid to behave like this in west Beirut and in Tripoli, and if they go on behaving like this, they will do great damage to their cause and ours. But the credit for that does not go to Bashir al-Jumayyil. Who is he to speak to the Moslems like this?

Would you agree to talk to him as one among others?

No, no. He represents a military faction, as I told you, and we have many military leaders with whom he can speak and who I think can cooperate, but not me for the time being.

So to summarize, you are drawing Bashir al-Jumayyil attention to the fact that if he goes on placing conditions for the presidential elections, you will place your own conditions, and if he wants to partition, you will go ahead and partition. And what you are asking him to do is to sever relations with Israel,...

Either we accept a unified country with a new social and political consensus after cutting relations with Israel or everyone goes his own way. If he goes with Israel, we will go with others. The world is full of countries ready to help us.

You are also asking him to stop placing conditions. What conditions are you referring to?

He is asking Moslems to accept his conditions against the Syrians and the Palestinians....

He talked about "confronting future developments together."

And what are the future developments he is talking about? He wants to play the Palestinians against the Syrians, the Syrians against the Palestinians, the Moslems against the Palestinians and the Syrians. This is basically what he is thinking of. He wants to get rid of everyone and then subdue the Moslems on his own conditions. We will not accept it.

The National Movement has blamed Israel, the Deuxieme Bureau and the Phalangist Party for the recent wave of terrorist bombs....

I don't blame those parties. That's my final word on the matter.

Who do you blame?

I cannot answer that now, but I don't blame those parties.

Do you expect those bombs to go on much longer?

Unfortunately, I don't expect them to stop. Certain parties, certain powers have decided that they can change the policies of other powers by bombing their embassies and threatening their diplomatic representatives. Never, since the middle ages, has this been the proper way. Even under the Tatars or Mongols, in the days of Genghis Khan, there was some respect for diplomatic representatives. Now, things are changing.

Do you fear a diplomatic exodus from Lebanon, after the departure of the Kuwaiti ambassador....

I expect a diplomatic exodus from West Beirut, yes, but not from Lebanon.

You think embassies are going to start moving to east Beirut?

To al-Jumayyil, mainly. That will help Bashir indirectly, of course, but I can't blame him for that. He is just profiting from our situation.

You expect even the Arab embassies to move to al-Hazimiyah?

I hope not, but one (the Iraqi embassy) has already moved, because its embassy here has disappeared. I expect the transfer of embassies to al-Hazimiyah. Rents are going to be quite high in al-Hazimiyah in the future.

How is it that the combined efforts of the ADF, the Palestinian Resistance and the National Movement have done nothing to stop this terrorism?

As for the ADF and the Palestinians, please ask them. Where the National Movement is concerned, we tried to apply a timid security plan a couple of months ago, and we failed. The reasons for our failure are not for publication now, but the day will come when we will explain them. The last party to be blamed is the National Movement.

I think and I hope the Palestinians and the others will prepare a solid, valid plan for the protection of foreigners and embassies and general security in west Beirut. I hope they will, with the help of the Internal Security Forces.

What about the decisions of the higher coordination committee to close party offices, collect arms, etc.--measures that were supposed to be implemented five months ago?

Collecting arms and closing offices is an old story. These days, everyone is opening more offices and spreading more arms. The higher coordination committee is going to meet in Damascus next week, I think, and I hope that this time we will finally achieve something.

Do you think further inter-party clashes--among the National Movement parties, between them and Amal, etc.--can be avoided if these decisions are not implemented and arms are not collected?

It would be better to implement the decisions. You cannot give arms to young people who are not politically conscious and let them loose in the streets. That is dangerous for everyone. The arms must be collected at any price.

And you think the Damascus meeting might yield some results in this respect?

I hope so. One must always hope.

Do you share the fears of an imminent Israeli attack on south Lebanon? Or did you feel in your talks with Philip Habib that such an attack was unlikely now?

When we met in Washington and here, Mr Habib was speaking constantly of such an attack: That if Israel was provoked, this time it would crush the Palestinians. That is how they put it. I told them, there and here, that such an attack would not change anything as far as the basic option was concerned: It might weaken the PLO military for a while, but it would greatly reinforce its political power.

But in the light of what I heard in those meetings, I expect anything from Israel, before or after April 25.

Did Mr Habib give any definition of "provocation?"

According to the Isarelis, anything that happens in the West Bank or Israel originates in Lebanon and is a provocation. Those things could originate in Syria or in Jordan, and they are definitely rooted in the national aspirations of the Palestinians living there, so why should everything be considered a provocation from Lebanon? Nobody knows. "Provocation" is a very relative term by the Israeli and American definitions.

Is it true that Mr Habib raised the possibility of extending President Sarkis' mandate if the Lebanese cannot agree on a president?

I don't know if he talked about it with others, but he didn't with me.

Did you get the impression that the Americans favor a particular candidate?

No, I didn't notice anything of that sort. So far, they don't have any candidate.

But Habib did talk about the presidential elections?

We talked about the elections in the sense that a normal transition was needed. That was the object of my trip to Washington and my talks with American officials. The presidential elections was one of the subjects I raised.

And how would you describe the American position on this issue, in the light of your talks in Washington and your meeting with Habib here?

I suppose it is in their interest to have a normal transition. And it is also within their means to exert pressure on certain Lebanese parties--mainly what is left of the Phalange Party or the "Lebanese Forces"--to have this normal transition. They can also exert pressure on Israel, because any Israeli invasion would definitely complicate matters.

You say Bashir al-Jumayyil is threatening to block the elections and the Americans can pressure him into dropping those plans. That means that you are placing a large measure of responsibility for what happens during the elections on the Americans, doesn't it?

I think so. They still have some influence in Lebanon, don't they? You did not tell me what you think the American position will be on the elections.

How can I know? Like others, I am trying to figure out what the American interest in Lebanon and the Middle East is. But we're talking about a big power which may have different options, different points of view, I don't know.

What did you ask the Americans to do concerning this issue?

Nothing at all. I just told them it would be better to have a normal transition. But I will never ask the Americans for anything, and I didn't ask them for anything--except on the issue of the Golan Druze. I asked them to pressure Israel into releasing the Druze leaders they have arrested and dropping their attempts to force the Druze to accept the Israeli identity cards. My main concern in the talks was Lebanon, but another main concern was the world and the Druze. We cannot dissociate ourselves from the Arab world or from the Druze of Israel or the Golan.

In light of your talks, do you think there is any chance that the Reagan administration will look at the Middle Eastern crisis in any way other than "the Israeli perspective," as you said in a recent interview?

That would be very difficult, especially with this administration, which is seeing red everywhere and is very anxious about the so-called Soviet threat to Central America. Israel is part of their global strategy. It could shield them from further Soviet threats in the Middle East. One way to respond against those threats, they feel, is to weaken the Palestinians and the Syrians--the so-called Soviet proteges.

Another thing is--why should they change their policy towards the Arabs? Where are the Arabs, and what are they doing now? One senior American official--I will not name him--told me: "Why should we care about you? We are getting your oil and no one is threatening us. So why should we care about you?" And he's right. Look at us--divided again, underdeveloped. Why should we blame them?

Would you say the U.S. has a policy on Lebanon?

It's part of their general Middle Eastern policy. They're thinking of their own interests. Do they think of a mini-state like Lebanon? I don't know. At the State Department, I noticed that they were interested in maintaining the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. But although the State Department can take decisions, well...anything can happen.

Do you think the 1,000 additional UN troops will be able to close the Davr-Mimas-Balat gap in the UNIFIL zone?

They can reduce tension at that famous breach or gap, but they would have to deploy on both sides--in the Arnun-Beaufort castle area and in Marj 'Uyun. Will Sa'd Haddad, meaning Israel, accept that? That is the question.

If they accept, the move will reduce tension and the danger of a major attack through the breach, although it will not stop other attacks on other Palestinian positions--like Ad-Damur or Sidon or Beirut--because Israel can attack by sea and by air.

But are the joint forces ready to accept UN troops in Beaufort?

I think so. I don't think they will object.

Do you expect the Arab Follow-up Committee to meet again and achieve something?

I don't know if they will meet, but I hope so, and in principle, they should achieve something. It would be quite disappointing if Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Syria were unable to achieve anything at all.

What are the chances of Egypt returning to the Arab community, in your opinion?

I think that part of the Arab world will return to Egypt after the withdrawal from Sinai. Some Arab countries will return to Egypt, resume diplomatic relations, invest money and so on. Egypt, as you know, will attend the non-aligned conference (in Baghdad next September), and it is still the major power in the Arab world.

Would you favor such a development?

In principle, I wouldn't, because the return of some Arab countries would mean their recognition of Camp David or their readiness to forget about the Palestinians. This would be very dangerous and damaging to the Palestinian cause and to us, the Lebanese. Because in that event, there would be no Palestinian solution in the near future and we would have to bear the consequences of the Palestinians' presence and so-called implantation here.

CSO: 4400/189

FRENCH PAPER COMMENTS ON HAMAH INCIDENTS

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Feb 82 p 1

[Text] What is one to think of the alarming information about the situation in Syria, issued simultaneously on Wednesday 10 February in Washington by the State Department and in Bonn by a communique of the Moslem Brotherhood? The latter not only confirms the CIA's information, mentioning a "popular uprising" in the town of Hamah, but also announces the "liberation" of this town by the mujahidin. If we are to believe the Islamic movement, these guerrilla fighters have occupied the town, after receiving the support of a government tank division and the refusal of the air force to put down the rebellion. Both the Moslem Brotherhood and the U.S. Government speak of "hundreds of killed and wounded."

If this information is correct, the regime of Gen Hafiz al-Assad is seriously threatened for the first time. The fighting would not be surprising by itself--the town of Hamah, one of the fiefs of the Islamic militants, has been the scene of other equally bloody skirmishes--but the lack of discipline within the armed forces would be a new and alarming phenomenon. The stability of the Baath regime depends entirely on the loyalty of the regular armed forces and paramilitary forces; up to now they have been able to contain the Moslem guerrilla fighters. If the news is true that Hamah is in their hands, the uprising will undoubtedly spread. The Moslem Brotherhood--the only political opposition force which has succeeded in organizing and arming itself--acts as a catalyst for the discontent of the people in all forms--economic, social, political, and religious.

The Damascus government, while admitting that there have been "searches" in Hamah, denies the information announced by Washington and accuses the American Government of "complicity" with the Moslem Brotherhood. How, indeed, can one explain the fact that both the Moslem Brotherhood and the State Department were silent until 10 February, although "serious trouble" is said to have started on 2 February? This coincidence may be an accident, but it is curious, nevertheless, that the American Government takes it upon itself to "reveal" to world public opinion events that are supposed to have occurred in a country with which the United States has normal relations.

The American Government is running a calculated risk of poisoning its relations with Damascus; these relations have already deteriorated since the Reagan administration opposed having the United Nations go beyond a platonic con-

demnation of Israel's annexation of Golan. Does Washington feel it has nothing to hope for from a government which is on intimate terms with the Soviet Union? That the days of Assad's regime are numbered, anyway?

The Baath regime is all the more vulnerable because of its isolation. Several neighboring states (Iran in particular) furnish money, weapons, and logistic support to "the Moslem Brothers' avant-garde" (the brotherhood's military wing). In Lebanon, the Syrian contingents of the FAD (Arab Dissuasion Force) look more and more like an occupation army.

President Assad does not seem to have any other political options. To cope with his enemies' attacks, he must strengthen his ties with the USSR--which provides him with various forms of aid--and step up his repression. But can he defend his regime indefinitely this way?

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CSO: 4418/13

YUGOSLAV PAPER INTERVIEWS SECRETARY GENERAL OF 'POLISARIO'

Sarajevo OSLOBODENJE in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 82 p 4

[Interview with Mohamed Abdelaziz secretary general of "Polisario" front of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic by Alija Nuhbegovic, editorial director of RTV Sarajevo. Date and place not given]

[Text] For 6 years now 27 February has been celebrated as Independence Declaration Day of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara). In honor of this occasion the editorial director of RTV Sarajevo, Alija Nuhbegovic, recently interviewed Mohamed Abdelaziz, general secretary of the "Polisario" front, which is waging a struggle for the liberation of that country and its complete independence, and chairman of the revolutionary Command Council. Published below are some excerpts from this interview.

[Question] The struggle of the people of the Western Sahara for national liberation and independence has been crowned with victory on both the domestic and international fronts. Can you tell us a little bit more about this?

[Answer] Eight years ago the people of the Western Sahara were waging an armed struggle under the leadership of the "Polisario" front. During the first phase of this struggle the people of the Western Sahara were fighting against Spanish colonialism, and then they were forced to fight against those who took up where Spain left off, that is, against the Moroccan-Mauritanian aggressors.

During the final phase of this struggle our people's arms are aimed solely against the Moroccan aggressors, since the Spanish colonialists have been driven out and a peace treaty has been signed with Mauritania. A wide-ranging information campaign has been mounted on the diplomatic front in order to acquaint those who cherish peace and freedom, including above all democratic forces throughout the world, with the justice of our cause. At this time we have succeeded in developing good relations with several countries and peoples both on the political party level and also on the level of various other organizations.

Another important aspect of this struggle involves efforts dedicated to conquering backwardness, illiteracy, and disease. Our people have been waging an equally important struggle in the realm of social services. Noteworthy successes have already been achieved in the construction of schools, in the advancement of education, and in the development of national cadres who are ready to undertake the difficult task of national construction. Progress of tremendous importance has been made in the area of health care services. In spite of environmental conditions, which are, to say the least, difficult, "Polisario"--the national front for the liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro--has succeeded in supplying substantial quantities of medicines and building health care facilities.

After 8 years of fierce resistance we are able to say that the struggle of our people has culminated in the liberation of almost all of our national territory and, in several instances, in the official recognition of the Arab Democratic Saharan Republic and its militant avantgarde, the "Polisario" front.

[Question] It is obvious that a high level of morale exists among the Saharan independence fighters. How was this achieved?

[Answer] The "Polisario" front is counting first and foremost on the support of the popular masses, and it is applying all appropriate methods in order to make the people aware of their responsibilities. This is one factor. That is to say, the war was fought by the people. Our people found that they were the target of one campaign of aggression that was dedicated to our destruction, to driving us from our homeland, and to wiping out everything that represented human and material support for the "Polisario" front. Each and every individual was placed in a position of extreme jeopardy as far as their physical survival, culture, dignity, and honor were concerned. Our people bore the full brunt of the occupation terror, and to a man they joined the "Polisario" front in order to defend themselves. They took up arms. This was the only choice they had, but by making this choice they won for themselves a glorious victory. And, apart from the fact that almost all of our national territory has been liberated as a result of major military victories, our people also have a powerful political organization. And it is for this very reason that great things are also being accomplished in the international arena.

The morale of this people is very high. It takes pride in the things which it has accomplished during this war. This makes it both proud and joyful. It owes everything it has accomplished to the fierce struggles it has waged in the fight for its honor and its fatherland.

[Question] The great victories which the Saharan people's army has won in its struggle against a conventional army give rise to the question: How was this possible?

[Answer] The military operations of our people's army are predicated on the faith of the Saharan independence fighters in the justice of their cause.

Our independence fighters are not afraid to make any sacrifice in order to defend their rights. In addition, there are certain other facts that need to be pointed out, such as: complete familiarity with the terrain, the ability to endure the most severe tests, resistance to the high heat and other hardships. But the most important factor is the justice of our cause, and the Saharan independence fighter is aware of this. This is a guarantee of victory. All the more so since the Saharan people are not an isolated example. There are other nations which have had to confront forces that were by far superior in terms of both their numerical and material strength, but were still victorious. There is a proverb which says that truth will always remain invincible. This means that just demands will always prevail. Nations which are conscious of their rights employ all available means to fight for these rights.

[Question] The Arab Saharan Democratic Republic has approached Morocco with a proposal outlining possible negotiated solutions to this conflict that would result in the granting of self-determination to the Saharan people. What do you expect will come of this proposal?

[Answer] We invited Morocco to join us at the conference table. Bearing in mind our own responsibility, we will continue to leave this invitation open, since this region must be free of war and embark upon an era of peace under conditions of good-neighborly relations and mutual cooperation. We believe that the vast resources which the Moroccan royal regime has invested in a war of aggression in the Western Sahara could be put to use for the benefit of the Moroccan people were they to be utilized for purposes of economic development and for the welfare of the Moroccan popular masses. We realize that peace is vital, and this is why we continue to call upon Morocco to heed the dictates of common sense and enter into direct negotiations with us with a view to resolving the questions at issue in our mutual relations. Our commitment to the establishment of peace is fully in accord with our resolve to carry on with our liberation struggle until all parts of our country are liberated and until all of our people are repatriated to their homeland.

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